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July 28, 1941

The Mirage of Production

by Michael Straight

Appeasers in the State Department . *Editorial*

Price Control in England . . *A. Wyn Williams*

Common Sense about the Army . . . *Editorial*

Veblen: Man from Mars . . . . *Edgar Johnson*

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

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Looking at the Russian Map

The outcome of the war in Russia still hangs in the balance and this will probably be true for many weeks to come. The communiqués from both sides are not illuminating; the map helps if Russian and German sources are in agreement about the status of a city at a given time. There is no doubt that in the fourth week, the German advance was slowed down. The question is whether it had slowed more than was natural in view of the lengthening lines of communication. On this point expert military opinion was divided. It is necessary to remember, of course, that a campaign like the German one goes in waves, with pauses between them. It would be dangerous to confuse such a pause with a real slowing down because of enemy action. An important unanswered question is how far the Russians can retreat in good order, maintaining an effective rear-guard action. Can they lose Kiev, Leningrad and Moscow and still maintain not merely the semblance of war but a really effective resistance, a resistance as strong as that of China against Japan? Probably nobody knows, not even Stalin.

Is the Invasion of Britain Postponed?

They are saying in London that the Russian campaign has already made impossible an attempt at invasion of England this year. Even if Stalin were to capitulate tomorrow, it is argued, it would take Hitler at least six weeks to reassemble his forces in the west on the scale necessary for the effort to get across the English Channel. There aren't another six weeks of fine weather left this summer. This sounds to us like a rather dangerous optimism. Two years ago, everyone thought the bombing raids would end with the winter storms, but they did not. There are plenty of days in autumn and winter when the weather should be good enough for an invasion attempt if Hitler were otherwise ready.

The real question is whether he does not intend to strike in some other direction first. He might turn to North Africa, which he could use as a pivot to attack in any one of several directions, including South America. We are told that Germany has recently built huge underground oil-storage tanks at Dakar, on the official theory that they would be used to supply a post-war German merchant marine trading with South America (where much oil comes from in the first place). He might decide, after mopping up European Russia, to go down to India and cut the lifeline of Empire at Singapore. He might conceivably turn still further east and strike down his half-hearted ally, Japan, as he has already tried to strike down another half-hearted ally, Russia.

LaGuardia Again

We are pleased but not surprised that Mayor LaGuardia of New York City has decided to run for another term, combining his municipal activities with his national office as Director of Civilian Defense. It is no secret at all that despite occasional derelictions Mayor LaGuardia is one of the best democrats and most useful public officers in the United States. It would be intolerable for New York City to be put into the hands of some bungling Tammany-controlled amateur at a moment when it may face an experience

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like that inflicted on London, Madrid and Chungking. The New York City Democrats, who have decided to put up a candidate against LaGuardia, have shown once more that they care nothing for the New Deal or for President Roosevelt. They are plotting to win if they can with the help of New York City's large contingent of Nazis and Fascists. We can't believe that they will succeed in their effort; and if they fail, we hope no more will be heard of Boss Edward J. Flynn of the Bronx, who by pure accident has been inflated to a size in the national Democratic Party for which his abilities and personality richly disqualify him.

Japan's Alternatives

The change of Cabinet in Japan indicates little more than a general dilemma in foreign policy. Admittedly, the new set-up has a predominance of military men; Mr. Matsuoka is out, and understandably so, since he is the gentleman responsible for much of the dilemma. His non-aggression treaty with Russia must have looked admirable at the time it was signed, extending the warm hand of friendship from the Axis powers to Moscow itself, and at the same time suggesting to the democracies the grim picture of a New Order stretching from Tokyo to Madrid without a break. Now Mr. Matsuoka has been betrayed by his German friends, and his successor must do some fast thinking. He must pick the winner in the Russo-German war and put Japan's shirt on it in time for such a gesture to mean something. For obvious reasons he will balk at choosing Russia; yet surely the choice of Germany and the idea of Vladivostok in Nazi hands are equally alarming to the Japanese. Quite apart from the discomfort of sharing living quarters with Hitler, Japan would add to her burden increased hostility on the part of the United States. Similarly, to ignore the Russo-German front and move into Indo-China would bring the same risk of a clash with the United States, and with Britain as well, while failure to do so might have a bad effect on Nazi-Japanese relations. However the new Cabinet may resolve this dilemma, it can hardly approach its task with any enthusiasm.

Whose V Are You Drawing?

In addition to their stepped-up bombings of German industrial areas, and the destruction of a large percentage of the German merchant marine, the British have made their first strong move toward coöperation with the conquered peoples of Europe. On the surface, their V campaign may appear paltry and devoid of practical use, but only if we ignore the time element in its institution. The British have a single immediate aim—to do all in their power to distract Germany from her Russian enemy. Heavy bombings have forced the return of fighter planes to the west; perhaps an outburst of resentment and impudence, symbolized by V, may demand from the Nazis some strengthening of their garrisons in the conquered areas. That Dr. Goebbels should have claimed V as his own is an indication that the Germans are not merely laughing it off. V is to be a German symbol and we see attractive possibilities in its use by Germans. Chalked on the sidewalk in Berlin or played to music, it would mean victory for the dear Fatherland and Führer. But would it? Could Dr. Goebbels be absolutely sure?

But Is It Fair to Adolf?

The American blacklist of 1,800 South American firms sent us thumbing through the news indexes to discover when the United States had last thrown its economic weight so effectively into the scales. Except for aid to Britain, we found nothing until we had searched five years back, to the late summer of 1936. The Franklin D. Roosevelt administration then acted most decisively in the battle betwen fascism and democracy, but that time, excuse it please, Mr. Roosevelt and the State Department had us fighting on the side of fascism. It makes incredible reading now, but then we sent an armed government vessel and a Coast Guard airplane to circle threateningly around the last vessel to clear our ports before that traitorous and Fascist-hearted fraud, the "neutrality" embargo, was slapped against the Spanish people. Our whole government was turning itself inside out because a shoestring free lance was reported to be flying old American planes to Mexico, which unenlightened country insisted on trading with the Loyalists.

Set in this perspective, it is pretty good news that the capacity of the United States for decisive action is not limited to action against its friends. At first thought it may seem incredible that we have so long permitted pro-Nazi agents to subvert the economic power of this country to anti-democratic ends in South America. But looking back as much as five years, the incredible thing must be that we acted at all. Could Hitler have been wrong about the stupid democracies? Or is the State Department being returned to the American people?

The Commissars Come Back

The report that the system of dual military and political command had been restored in the Russian army and navy was received in Berlin as good news; and by the same token, it is bad news here. Against any such division of authority, there are technical reasons of the greatest weight, and there must therefore have been weighty reasons of another kind for its adoption. What these reasons are, is a subject for enlightened guessing; but the most natural supposition is that the government knows of, or suspects, a certain amount of political unreliability among the officers of the army, and is overreaching itself in a wholesale attempt at discovery and suppression.

Political commissars were first employed with the Red Army in the early years of the Soviet regime,

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when there was a great dearth of trained military men and the new government had no choice but to employ many of the old Imperial officers and at the same time watch them carefully. As time passed, a prodigious amount of energy was expended in the technical and political training of a new corps of officers, drawn chiefly from the working class and the peasantry; and when the officers of the old army had been largely replaced by these new stalwarts, the system of political check-up men was abolished. Then, in the height of the great purge of 1936-38 (the greatest since the period of the civil war and the foreign intervention in 1918-21), political commissars were once more sent out to the forces. This suggested that even the new-made officers' corps harbored a dissent; and very soon this suspicion was confirmed by reports of numerous shootings. When the commissars were withdrawn after the Finnish war, this was generally accepted as evidence of the increased confidence of the government in the army. But now, at the height of another crisis, these political inspectors have once more appeared with the forces.

Most Americans will read this as an evidence of weakness and of a wide revival of those police methods that have been the most repellent feature of Russian revolutionary history; and many may even be tempted to withdraw their sympathy and support from the Soviet Union in its fight with the German Golem. Our own attitude is exactly the opposite of this. Whatever may be the cruelties of the Soviet regime, we hope that the Russian people will eventually get the power—and be left in peace—to remedy them. We see no hope in the black convulsions of a counter-revolution under the auspices of Hitler or of anyone else. Against Germany's advancing power of evil the Russians have already exerted more force than all the rest of the world combined has yet expended in this cause. The Russians are strong but they need our help; and there is no better way to help ourselves than by helping them.

Too Optimistic?

On page 110 we print an article on the Russian army by Max Werner. Mr. Werner's views are his own; they are highly interesting and are an important check on the opinions of most other military experts. We have no grounds for denying his relative optimism, but there are certain points in his article which seem questionable to us. He argues, for example, that because the Luftwaffe failed to blast the congested British fighter-bases out of action they have little chance to cripple the scattered Russian bases. Yet surely more than a matter of land surface is pertinent? Were not the British bases saved largely by the superiority of their own fighters over the invaders? Later, Mr. Werner argues that "the greater part of Soviet aviation is qualitatively equal to the German." Without denying this, we would like to emphasize that since 1938 reporters in Russia have frequently mentioned Russian shortages of machine tools and the consequent problem of effectively tooling-up for the production of new plane models. The United States successfully worsened this problem with a ban on machine-tool exports to the USSR.

Finally, it seems to us that Mr. Werner is overoptimistic regarding the state of Russian railway communications. The Russians report that all important railways are "functioning regularly," but the Leningrad-Odessa line would appear to have been seriously crippled by the German advance. On the other hand, Mr. Werner quite rightly points out that in the areas of German penetration the lines which the Nazi army might use have been "laid waste by war operations." But he goes on to draw a comparison by saying that the railroads supplying the Red Army "have had to suffer only from German aerial bombardment." Such bombardment may be comparatively less crippling than anything the captured railroads may have had to suffer, but it is possibly a more serious matter than Mr. Werner indicates.

Unite and Conquer

The wisdom of the East is not clearly evident in the continued troubles between the Chinese Communist army and the forces of the Chungking government—troubles that serve the interest of no one except the Japanese and their Nazi and Fascist allies. If one is to believe the charges of the National Military Council at Chungking, the Communists have recently made five separate attacks upon the troops of General Chiang Kai-shek, the latest as recently as July 8. The dispatches that bring the news of these disturbances also announce the arrival at Chungking of American technicians and pilots, and of Owen Lattimore, who went out to give advice to the Chinese Generalissimo and incidentally to deliver to him a personal message from President Roosevelt. Well, the best advice that Washington can give to Chiang Kai-shek, and the best that Moscow can give to the Chinese Communists, is that they all patch up their differences immediately and turn their undivided attention toward chasing the Japanese into the ocean. The USSR and the United States have given, and are giving, substantial aid to China, and at the moment the interests of Washington and Moscow in this matter of domestic unity in China are identical. If they will only speak out, the Chinese will certainly listen and obey.

Canada and Conscription

A New Republic friend of the isolationist persuasion queries us sternly on a postcard: "What about Canada?" He feels that since Canada has not instituted conscription, the United States should not. The facts about Canadian enlistments are as follows: the total active strength is 300,000; 220,000 men (in round numbers)

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are in active army service; between 80,000 and 90,000 are in active service overseas, 20,000 of them in the Royal Navy and 60,000 in the RAF. In the last war, Canada enlisted 660,000 recruits and sent 425,000 into active overseas service. Canada recently closed a recruiting campaign which added 34,000 men to the army. Present plans call for 7,000 men a month to be enlisted from now on, as replacements. No new divisions are contemplated. It was common knowledge that the recruiting campaign dragged. The Vancouver Daily Province, for example, said editorially, "Whatever we ought to do about service under arms in Canada, it is emphatically not true to say that the volunteer system is justified by the results of the present recruiting campaign." Quebec, incidentally, exceeds its quota of volunteers.

What Canada should do to raise troops is her business, as what we should do is ours. The New Republic does not believe that the United States is fighting Britain's war; nor does it believe that Britain is fighting ours. We do believe that both are fighting for survival and that the interests of both nations coincide in major ways.

Last Week

Yosuke Matsuoka, Japan's Foreign Minister who resigned last week, announced that he was going to devote himself to reading. Perhaps in his term of office he was confused by some of the words used by American public men, as who is not? Speech in the United States is exceedingly free. We wish it to remain so, but we would welcome analysis of some of the words. Mr. Matsuoka, blessed with a reflective mind, could perform a friendly act if he would make a study of the speeches of Alf M. Landon. Mr. Landon, who carried two states out of forty-eight in a presidential election, is by the laws of American political life now an oracle. We have learned to approach his words with the same trepidation with which Mr. Matsuoka approaches his Emperor. "Furthermore," said Mr. Landon last week, "if there is no stopping of Mr. Roosevelt's war policies, he will throw the finest untrained and unequipped army in the world into a shooting war." This group of vowels and consonants means something, but what? Only a man with the leisure that the last Japanese Foreign Minister is certain to have is in a position to work it out. . . . Coming nearer home than Kansas, a Japanese scholar could find rich material in the vocal output of Sheridan Downey, United States Senator from California. Mr. Downey told the Senate Military Affairs Committee that by April the United States will be outproducing Germany. The session was secret so the statistical evidence unfortunately was not free. Senator Downey is worried about this. "If the trend in rearmament were allowed to spiral continuously upward," The New York Times quotes him as saying, "we may have some 30,000,000 unemployed at the end of the war." On our third reading of the speech, Mr. Downey still seems to be saying that the United States is in danger of producing too much "arms and matériel." There is unquestionably too much "matériel" being tossed about, and possibly too much "spiral," but of good, simple war material the evidence we are privy to indicates a shortage. Mr. Matsuoka, we feel sure, would differ here.

Common Sense about the Army

THE OPPOSITION in the country to the proposal to keep drafted men and National Guardsmen in the army more than a year, and the reluctance of Congress to sanction this request of the administration, are a commentary on the naïveté of the United States in its new role as a military power. One would think that the army was just something to support because it is the fashion, or because it gives young men something to do, or because we like to read about its weapons and maneuvers, rather than that it is an instrument of national policy.

The size and kind of army you must have depend upon the tasks which it may be called upon to fulfill. That is the most elementary axiom of military policy. Why have we adopted conscription and voted billions for our military establishment? We should hardly have done so if there were not danger stalking the world. Let us assume that our purpose was no broader than that sanctioned by the narrowest non-interventionist—defense of this country in case the Allies lose the war, and as a means to that end, hemispherical defense. What would an army for this purpose have to be prepared to do?

In the first place, it would have to provide ample garrisons for all our outposts—Hawaii, Alaska, Panama, the Philippines, the old bases in the Caribbean, the new ones obtained from Britain, and now Iceland. No one can promise that more may not have to be added.

Next, the army would have to man a long series of coast defenses and anti-aircraft units along our four borders. Everybody wants a big air force, too, and each bomber and fighter demands not only its pilots and crews but a sizable ground establishment. Then we must possess highly mobile and well trained land armies in every sector of the country, including armored and mechanical units in plenty, ready to pounce upon any invader who might avoid the navy and make a landing on our shores, as well as any who might make his way through Canada or Mexico. Finally, we should have a body of men trained to constitute a sizable expeditionary force, prepared at a moment's notice to embark for and operate in any region in North and South America or their outlying territories which might be subject to attack. This whole army

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should be built with the idea that we may have to fight, without major allies, against two or more first-class enemies.

Not being military experts, we are not prepared to say how large such an army must be or what should be its exact composition. But we think hardly anyone would be rash enough to argue that a million and a half or two million thoroughly trained men would be too many, as a permanent establishment. The army must be ready for instant action. And new recruits cannot man garrisons, handle tanks or artillery, or fly and repair planes. In addition to this nucleus, we could be doubly assured by several million reservists in the civil population who had been trained for a year or more and could be called to the colors when a shooting war began.

Any possibility that national policy would dictate sending armed forces to Asia, Africa or Europe would of course emphasize the need for a military establishment of at least this size.

In these circumstances, we cannot understand how anyone would wish to compel the demobilization of about three-quarters of the officers and two-thirds of the men of our present inadequate and far from fully trained army, even if their places are to be taken by new draftees. Nor can we understand how the administration, the army authorities or Congress could ever have offered ground for the expectation that any such course could be followed. If we already had a sufficiently large permanent force—permanent, that is, as long as international anarchy reigns—then it would be good policy to call up new classes for a year's or eighteen months' training, discharging them periodically when their period of service was over, holding them in the status of reserves, and calling them out for maneuvers as often as necessary to keep them in touch with military practice. But we cannot start to do that when the nucleus of the trained army is spread so thin as at present.

The question is, what can be done, now that the awkward situation has been allowed to arise? A number of solutions are possible, but we would recommend the following. Hold the present draftees in the army as long as they are needed. Conduct an intensified drive among the trainees and those registered but not called, for long-term enlistments. Allow the older men and any others who have dependents or face some other important obligation in civil life to be discharged, up to the point where the number of discharges would begin to be too great. When the permanent force had reached the necessary size, adopt the policy of regular training periods for conscripts, which the people thought they were getting in the existing law. Whatever the present injustice to individuals or disappointments to expectations, the nation in this crisis of world history must quickly have—and keep—an invincible army.

Civil Liberties in Minneapolis

TWENTY-NINE PEOPLE have been indicted in Minneapolis on the ground of advocating the overthrow of the government of the United States by armed force. This is one of the most serious issues involving civil liberties to arise in the United States in many years. Among the chief dramatis personae are: Daniel J. Tobin, head of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (AFL) and long a warm friend of President Roosevelt; Dave Beck, Seattle teamster leader and the most important AFL labor man on the Pacific Coast, with a long career of strong-arm labor activity behind him, and the Dunne brothers, teamster leaders of Minneapolis, with a record as violent as Beck's.

The Dunne brothers are the overlords of a Minneapolis truckmen's union, which largely duplicates the membership of the Socialist Workers' Party. This is a group of theoretical Trotskyist Communists. Even the government admits that they have not recently committed any overt act in support of their communism.

The Minneapolis teamsters were for a long time members of the AFL, though they were constantly at swords' points with Tobin. A few weeks ago the union went over to the CIO, being taken in by A. D. Lewis, brother of John L. The CIO Teamsters' Union is pretty much a paper organization.

Since the shift to the CIO was made, Tobin has sent Dave Beck of Seattle to Minneapolis with a group of AFL "organizers" to try to persuade the Minneapolis teamsters to come back to the fold. Sources in Minneapolis say that the Seattle delegation's tactics, as might be expected, were exercised with blackjacks.

Spokesmen for the Trotskyist-teamsters in Minneapolis say that the indictment is not even-handed justice but is a political reprisal. They say that Beck spoke to Tobin, Tobin complained to high officials in Washington about Minneapolis and that political pressure was used on the Department of Justice to bring about the indictments. The argument is simple: Tobin is President Roosevelt's friend and helped him get reelected. John L. Lewis is the President's enemy, an isolationist, and controls the CIO teamsters.

Whether the action was politically motivated or not, it is one of the most extraordinary affairs in the whole history of the Department of Justice. One has to go back to the Great War and the hysteria of the years just following for any sort of parallel. It is tacitly admitted in Washington that this is a prosecution for opinion only. The action is taken partly under a law governing "seditious conspiracy," enacted during the American Civil War, and partly under the Smith Act, introduced in 1939. The Smith Act makes it illegal to advocate "the overthrow of the government by force or violence," even though you never do anything to put your ideas into effect. Spokesmen for the Socialist

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Workers' Party insist that they do not even engage in such advocacy. Invariably it has been found in practice that such laws could be stretched almost indefinitely.

For many years Justices Holmes and Brandeis voted for the defendants in cases like these, on appeal to the Supreme Court (usually in the minority). In a famous phrase, they held that men should not be punished for advocacy of revolution unless there was "a clear and present danger" to our society. Mr. Justice Holmes in a historic dissent in the Abrams case, in 1919, spoke approvingly of "free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and the truth is the only ground upon which [men's] wishes safely can be carried out. . . . I think we should be sternly vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country." In subsequent decisions, Justices Holmes and Brandeis repeatedly held that members of various revolutionary sects had not placed the country in any "clear and present danger."

That the Minneapolis case is tremendously important goes without saying. President Roosevelt and Acting Attorney General Francis Biddle have repeatedly promised that there would be no such violations of civil liberties as stained the honor of America in the last war. For a country preparing to fight for the principles of democracy now to violate those principles either in hysterical fear of a little handful of theoretical Communists, or as part of a sordid political maneuver to help the AFL and hurt the CIO, would be unforgivable; it would be worth ten divisions to Hitler. For that reason we ask our readers to suspend judgment until the facts are a little clearer. We promise to report fully and promptly on those facts.

What Price Control Means

THE ARTICLE on page 112 of this issue on "Price Control in England," by A. Wyn Williams, emphasizes several large lessons about price control in wartime that we ought to have learned from our own experience in the last war. One is that if serious shortages are threatened in a number of commodities, while the purchasing power of the public is increased, and prices start to soar, halfway measures will not do. All prices are more or less interrelated. Control cannot therefore be piecemeal, leaving out important sectors of the economy. The controls, moreover, must be applied as early as possible, and simultaneously. Otherwise the effect is much the same as piecemeal regulation: the uncontrolled prices will react on those that have been fixed. Finally, it is futile to rely on voluntary action by those engaged in production, or even on governmental price-fixing if the power is in the hands of representatives of the industries concerned.

Within these limitations, a variety of means of price control are available. It is not necessary to adopt the device advocated by Bernard M. Baruch, of freezing all prices as of a certain date, and therefore putting the burden of proof on anyone who desires a change. But it is necessary to have a comprehensive plan, capable of being put into effect promptly and of being fairly and energetically administered.

The principal objections to rigid and comprehensive price control have come from business, speculative interests, the farm bloc and labor. The opposition by business is by no means unanimous, and is aimed not so much by all business at the general idea, as by specific business groups at specific controls of their own prices. But business in the long run stands to gain rather than to lose by general and efficient price control. For it would govern the costs as well as the selling prices of each concern, and would offer far greater security than the scramble of an inflationary market. Only the monopolists and those in positions of special privilege would suffer. Speculators, whatever their function may be in business-as-usual, have no place in a war economy, and their protests must be flatly opposed, because the best argument for price control is that they dislike it.

In the control of crop prices at the farm we have a special situation. For years both the farmers and the government have been trying vainly to raise farm prices to the same relationship with industrial prices that they enjoyed before the last war. Farm spokesmen have argued cogently that the farmer was the orphaned child of our economy because of this long continued price disparity: he has to buy at higher prices and sell at lower. There is just as much justice in this plea now as there was during the depression, when the AAA was adopted to assist in rectifying the discrimination. Farm prices, though they have risen rapidly in recent months, have not yet attained pre-war parity. We think they should attain it. If they do, then the rise ought to be stopped at that point. Farmers ought to remember that parity can never be achieved if inflation of industrial prices is allowed, and they should support price control for that reason.

As for crop prices themselves, many of them can be kept from rising above parity by use of the governmentally controlled surpluses now held off the market. When the surpluses give out, the higher prices will doubtless have stimulated larger production (since there is no agricultural monopoly in this country and our land resources are ample). The AAA can allow production to increase up to the point justified by demand. Control of maximum crop prices will be easy, without issuing any edicts. It is not necessary therefore to include them in the general bill—unless by way of declaring a policy.

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Labor's objections also can be met. Labor, of course, has little opposition to price control of the things wage-earners buy; indeed, the workers are the first to suffer from a rapidly rising cost of living. What the unions dislike is a proposal arbitrarily to freeze wages. But that is not necessary. Wages are not prices, and need not be included in a price-control bill. Wages may affect prices in two ways: first, through their influence on labor cost; second, through their effect on market demand. But these effects are not automatic.

In many cases wage increases may be accompanied by reductions of cost of production—as through larger use of productive facilities or improvements in technology. Or they may be met out of existing profits, without increase in prices. Labor-adjustment machinery ought to adopt wage policies, clearly sanctioned by labor, in line with the price-control policy. Where wage increases are otherwise justified, and may be made without necessitating price increases, they obviously should be granted. If they do threaten to affect costs in such a way as to force prices up, they should be denied unless extraordinary need exists. Other considerations, such as attracting labor to the more essential industries, should also be considered. As far as the purchasing power arising from wage increases is concerned, and its effect on markets, the increases might be granted in the form of government savings bonds, above a certain level.

In any case we shall have to return to the task of enlarging the supply of commodities, out of our immense store of materials, and of limiting the purchasing power of the population as long as articles in demand are scarce. But that will take time, and the need for broad price control is immediate.

State Department Appeasers

FOR MANY MONTHS The New Republic has been urging upon the President the necessity of removing from the State Department those officials who still believe in appeasing the Fascists. Our readers have responded warmly to this idea, but many have written to ask the legitimate question: To whom do you refer? At any given moment, it is difficult to ferret out the responsibility for actions that are being taken; but this is much less true in regard to the past. It is much easier to know who was guilty of appeasement a few months or a few years ago. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is fair to assume that these men still hold the same attitude.

Appeasement of the Fascists as a policy first became conspicuous when the Spanish Republic was fighting for its life. At that time the attitude of individuals varied from indifference on the part of such men as Sumner Welles to active pro-Franco sympathy on the part of Ambassador Kennedy and the State Department Political Adviser (for Europe) James C. Dunn. Both Welles and Hull at various times advised the President against lifting the embargo upon the Loyalist government. It has been reported that Ambassador Bullitt took the same stand, on the ground that we should not embarrass the British and French governments, which were also engaged in appeasing Italian and Spanish fascism.

When the European war began in 1939, Sumner Welles was the leader of a powerful group in the State Department which believed that Italy could be kept neutral. Mussolini was therefore permitted to purchase oil and other vital supplies from the United States, some of which were passed along to Germany. When Il Duce had thus built up ample stocks for what he thought would be a short struggle, he went to war. Since then, officials of the Department and its spokesmen have tried to appease the Fascist governments at Madrid, Vichy and Tokyo, and of course the numerous Latin American dictatorships.

For the appeasement of Franco, our Ambassador to Spain, Alexander Weddell, must be held primarily responsible. At the time of Weddell's appointment, Franco was executing Loyalist prisoners at the rate of 150 a week. Weddell closed his eyes to this and told his friends he was entering Spain "as innocently as a child entering a dark room." His subsequent expressions were strongly pro-Franco, and his wife actually donated an orphanage to the Women's Auxiliary of the Falange—the Fascist party.

In coöperation with Sir Samuel Hoare, British Ambassador to Spain, Weddell worked out a scheme to give Franco a credit of $100,000,000 payable in American food supplies, principally wheat. The plan was actively pushed in the Department by Dunn and Assistant Secretary Breckenridge Long. Exposed in the press, it was temporarily withdrawn, and then finally worked out secretly, using Argentina as an intermediary. This friendly action toward Franco was in marked contrast to the earlier hostile acts toward the Loyalist government of Joseph Green, Chief of the Division of Controls, who refused licenses for the export of planes to Greece and Turkey on the ground that they might be transshipped to Loyalist Spain. The failure of the pro-Franco policy was demonstrated only a few days ago when Franco in a public speech virtually told the United States to go and mind its own business.

The appeasement of Vichy has been primarily the work of Welles and Adolf A. Berle Jr. A recent example was the sending of a large amount of oil to Weygand in North Africa, over the strong protests of the British. The Department claims that the result of sending oil, food and other materials to France and French North Africa has been to neutralize General Weygand during the Syrian campaign and to hinder the armies of General Rommel in Libya. Whether this is really true it is impossible to say, but there seems little evidence to

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support the contention, and the British, who ought to know, appear to disbelieve it. Any policy of appeasement, of course, looks like a success momentarily while the appeasee is keeping quiet and collecting the swag.

The appeasement of Japan has consisted largely in continuing to send her war materials in spite of the fact that we are also aiding China. The argument was that by doing so we prevented Japan from going to war with us or, at least, seizing the Dutch East Indies. An important supporter of appeasement for Japan was Hugh Wilson, who resigned following the election last November. Two others are Berle and Maxwell Hamilton, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. Dean Acheson, recently appointed Under-secretary of State, in testifying before a congressional committee, not only supported appeasement but demanded that Congress should not even investigate this situation. Only Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, Political Adviser on the Far East, has actively fought the policy of appeasement.

Anti-democratic actions have come conspicuously from the visa division, headed by Avra Warren. With the collaboration of Assistant Secretary Long, the division has actively sabotaged the President's Advisory Committee for Political Refugees, which is trying to rescue outstanding anti-Fascists from Europe. Everyone else who has tried to aid the refugees has had a similar experience. It is common gossip in Washington that there is widespread anti-Semitism in the foreign service. Consuls in Europe who have repeatedly been charged with putting difficulties in the way of Jews seeking American visas are Leland B. Morris, of Berlin, and James B. Stewart, of Zurich.

The men mentioned above should not be understood as invariably agreeing with one another, or as holding the same attitude of appeasement toward all countries. Some of them, while demanding conciliation of a given country, would take a stiff line toward others. Some of them, certainly, have made outstanding expressions of sympathy with the democratic way of life. The situation is confused and chaotic, like so much of the Department itself.

How does it happen that so many important government officials take attitudes which seem at variance with American principles? The whole answer would require a fat book, but there are some points that can be mentioned briefly.

First of all, the State Department's permanent staff has for generations been selected on a basis of wealth and social position. In recent years efforts have been made to remedy this, but they have been only partially successful. Even when wealth is not still required, social prestige is a highly desirable qualification. The little circle of men with money or family or both, in a few big Eastern cities, is a bad training ground for true democrats or men of outstanding abilities.

Another weakness is that advancement in the Department has gone largely by seniority plus the favoritism of the men higher up. This has encouraged both the stupid man who managed to hang on a long time and the servile toady.

Because of the nature of its work, the State Department has been a nest of secrecy. It has been accountable to no one except a President who is much too busy to know what is going on, and content to take the word of a Secretary of State who might himself be, and in the past sometimes has been, an incompetent who got his job chiefly for political reasons. Congressional committees of inquiry could be shrugged off with a statement that the information they wanted was prejudicial to national safety.

To some extent, it is the fault of Congress that as a rule only men of wealth or social prestige have been able to afford to hold a State Department job. The Department has always been too proud and too politically inept to ask for the money it needed. It has had no influence on the Hill, except for the visa department, which has been able to do innumerable favors for congressmen. At this moment, the State Department appropriation ought to be doubled at the very least.

The result of all this has been a small, self-perpetuating group of men operating in secrecy according to their own unchecked judgment. In other government departments, as in private life, a man can make a certain number of mistakes, and he is through. But in the State Department, there is no limit to the number of times you can be proved wrong without losing your power to go on making mistakes of the same sort.

It seems to us imperative for an all-out democratic effort that the Department should clean house. We should like to see a congressional investigation during which men would not be permitted to hide behind the plea of government secrets when it was obvious that the only government secret involved was incompetence, their own or others'. Then we should like a New Deal Department, with greatly increased appropriations and a guarantee to the people that henceforth it would be one appropriate to America and the American way of life.

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

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The Mirage of Production

On APRIL 15, almost a year after the beginning of the defense program, Mr. Biggers, Director of Production of the OPM, promised that within a hundred days, tanks, guns and aircraft would be rolling out of the American factories.

On Tuesday of last week, the Hundred Days of John D. Biggers were up. The facts about production seem to be these:

Ordnance. – Production is almost criminally low. There is no significant production in ordnance at the present time.

Anti-Aircraft. – The schedules call for great increases in production. But the schedules themselves are puny in relation to need.

Ammunition. – The production of ammunition is pitifully small.

Aircraft. – The production of aircraft is slowly creeping up although a year has been wasted because, largely for reasons of prestige, stress was placed on fighter instead of heavy-bomber production. For the aircraft production which we have now we can thank not the War Department or the NDAC or the OPM, but the governments of Britain and France which ordered the plants and paid dearly for them.

Railway Cars. – New rolling stock is essential to the defense effort if we are to avoid a crippling shortage. We need 15,000 new cars a month. We are producing no more than 5,000 a month.

Tanks. – The factories are just beginning to turn out tanks, and equipment is lacking for mass production.

Shipping. – We are still nowhere near an all-out shipping effort, although the present low schedules are being doubled.

Lease-Lend. – In the President's progress report on lease-lend of June 10, it was stated that of $1,300,000,000 worth of army and navy equipment authorized for Britain, $60,000,000 has been given up by the War and Navy Departments for actual shipment.

In the new heavy-bomber program, the four-billion-dollar ordnance program and the new shipbuilding schedules, a vigorous effort is being made by the President to raise defense production. But we are still far from an all-out effort. The War Department is just beginning to think in terms of what is needed for victory.

Why has production stumbled so badly? Each industry has its own well prepared answer. Why do we lack airplanes? Because we lack ordnance. Why do we lack ordnance? Because there aren't enough machine tools. Why aren't there enough machine tools? The machine-tool manufacturers blame it on the steel industry. The steel industry blames it on the metallurgical industries. The metallurgical industries blame it on the transportation industry. Transportation officials turn it back to lack of steel. Is this our "brilliant if pitiless" industry that General Ludendorff once praised so highly? It has not shown much brilliance, and if it is pitiless, against whom has this quality been mainly directed? The destroyers of democracy or those who are defending it?

The responsibility for our failure so far falls first upon the officials of the defense administration. Their sights were set too low; they never looked ahead. They had sufficient power to act on production, but they have, almost without exception, made no dent in the production picture. The officials of the OPM in each industry division are the representatives of the industry in question. The consultant on steel has been the president of the Iron and Steel Institute. The Transportation Division is the personal property of the American Association of Railroads. The Paper and Pulp Section consists of men from the Paper and Pulp Institute. The Copper Division is run by representatives of the Kennecott Copper Company. These men are recruited from the same "noble army of controllers" that nearly wrecked England. Not consciously, not deliberately. They don't try to forward their own immediate interests. But they are in Washington principally to protect the interests of their own industries. They aren't deliberately selfish; they are simply incapable of thinking in terms of the public interest.

Are these men alone to blame? If only they could be blamed, there would at least be something at which to strike. But blows aimed at the officials of the OPM glance off, hitting the entire administrative structure of the defense program. It is loose, illogical, haphazard and destructive of time and energy. It resembles the earliest attempts at administration in the First World War. These attempts were costly then and they are more costly now. But apparently we have to go through the old process of refusing to be taught by anything but our own most recent mistakes.

There are three main administrative weaknesses in the defense structure. The first is the duplication of authority; the second is the misdirection of authority; the third is the absence of central direction.

The duplication of authority is extraordinary. There is a Construction Section in the Production Division of the OPM. There is a Construction Section in the Priorities Division of the OPM. There are construction units in the Price Administration Section and the Civilian Supply Section of OPACS. Then there is a Construction and Real Estate Branch of the Supply Division of the General Staff of the War Department. There is a Real Estate Committee of the Procurement Division of the OPM. There is a Construction Divi-

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sion in the Office of the Quartermaster General and a Construction Advisory Committee under this division. There is also the Construction Division of the Navy Supply Division.

In raw materials there is the Materials Section of the Production Division of the OPM; the Materials Section of the Priorities Division of the OPM; the Materials Divisions of both sections of OPACS and the Raw Materials Division of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. All of these sections and divisions break down into almost identical units dealing with iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, rubber, etc.

In finished products, there is the same duplication. There is the Aircraft, Ordnance and Tools Branch of the Production Division of the OPM. There are the Aircraft and the Tools and Equipment Divisions of the Procurement Division, and the Machine Tools and Equipment Sections of the Priorities Division, each with their own subdivisions, which in turn have their exact counterparts in the aircraft and ordnance divisions of the War and Navy Departments. The same is true of shipbuilding and of almost all the other items which enter into defense production. Of course some work is done in each of these units which is not, and could not be, done elsewhere. But, in the main, officials of all of these divisions toil over the same estimates, inspect the same factories, pat the same workers on the back and give the same hopeful stories to the press. They don't always fight. Sometimes it would be better if they did.

To add to this nightmare of divided authority, there are whole sections of defense, such as propaganda and economic warfare, in which there is no authority at all. We must export the arms that we produce before they can be used, but in addition to the OPM, OPACS and the War and Navy Departments, the Lease-Lend Administration, the Tariff Commission, the Maritime Commission, the Office of the Administrator of Export Control, the Division of Controls in the State Department, the Division of Commercial and Cultural Relations with the Latin Americas and one or more divisions of the Treasury and Commerce Departments as well as the Bureau of the Budget and the White House, all have a hand in untying and tying up the red tape before clearance for export is finally made. Most of these civilian agencies are constantly trying to increase their own powers at the expense of the others; the results are almost unbelievable.

From the duplication of functions in the defense administration, the division of responsibility inevitably results. But, unfortunately, what responsibility there is, is centered in the wrong agencies. The outstanding administrative lesson of the last war, which has been so strongly stressed by Bernard M. Baruch and other wartime leaders, is that while the army and navy must be solely responsible for determining what war equipment is needed and at what time, the responsibility for seeing that the equipment is contracted for and produced must rest with civilian agencies. Yet today, it is the War and Navy Departments which bear almost the entire burden of obtaining defense production. They decide what is needed; they chose the plant sites; they pick the contractors; they draw up the contracts. Because they are inexperienced and ill equipped for the job, it is done slowly and inadequately. But the OPM is permitted to do little more than approve contracts of more than $500,000 and give the manufacturer an occasional dig in the ribs after the contract has been signed and work has begun.

It is terribly hard for people outside of Washington to realize that the officials of the OPM who talk so much do so little, but it is true. The members of the Labor Division of the OPM and the Mediation Board have their jobs to do and go their own ways. The other fourteen hundred employees of the OPM sit at their desks all day and seem to be working hard, but what they are working at, what they accomplish, what would happen if a bomb went off and destroyed them all, nobody knows. While the army and navy run the defense program, the officials of the OPM make speeches or simply sit "pinnacled dim, in the intense inane."

Once the OPM was nothing more than a little advisory commission. Now it is a great hulk of a thing and it still lives by sufferance of the War and Navy Departments. It cannot initiate any policy without their approval. It cannot for long prevent any move which they care to make. If the OPM were staffed with vigorous men, they would fight for the functions which are rightfully theirs but which the War and Navy Departments have assumed and are reluctant to give up. But instead the OPM is stuffed with business men who are primarily concerned with protecting their own interests, and with good fellows like Merrill C. Meigs, the Chicago publisher who wandered into the Aircraft Section of the OPM, of which he is now chief, through his hobby of taking week-end jaunts in his private plane. It is the same story in most of the other divisions. The army has neither the knowledge nor the inclination to insist on subcontracting in defense contracts. But Robert L. Mehornay, chief of the Defense Contract Service Section of the OPM, has to be himself convinced of the need for subcontracting before he can convince anyone else. Never was so much withheld from so many by so few.

In procurement, a forceful administrator, Donald Nelson, has sought to obtain more power. He has still not received it. Procurement of equipment and commercial supplies for the army is handled by the Quartermaster General. The contracts are reviewed in outline by Nelson's Procurement Division of the OPM. Since Nelson does not have any actual procurement responsibilities, and since many contracts are reviewed by the Production Division rather than by the Procurement Division, it might be expected that Nelson

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would at least be permitted to direct the general procedures of procurement. But the Under-secretary of War has his own committee to provide this function. The failure of this committee to perform its functions was presumably one reason why the inexperienced Quartermaster Corps made so many blunders in its purchases of lumber, shoes, woolen goods and other products. Nelson was barely consulted in many of these purchases, just as Frank Knight was barely consulted in the last war. Nelson's lack of power led him to the point of resignation in the spring of 1941.

In the administration of priorities, the division of authority is carried to the point of absurdity. Take the case of copper. The copper producers state that their production for July will be, say, 100,000 tons. Of this, 80,000 tons are preëmpted for government orders by the Army and Navy Munitions Board. The Board then determines the way in which the defense needs will be given preference within the 80,000 tons preëmpted. A priorities schedule is prepared in which A1 rating is given, say, to cartridge casings, A2 to shell casings and so on. Amounts of copper are then allotted to each and the final schedule is sent to officers in the field who issue preference ratings to the manufacturers who use the copper. A priorities order is then issued by the Priorities Division.

The allocation of the 20,000 tons which is not preempted remains. It is handled not by the Priorities Division, but in the Office of Civilian Supply in OPACS, which is without power, and whose recommendations go back to the Priorities Division to administer. Given the kind of officials in the Priorities Division who prefer allocation to expansion, it was just as well that the allocation of civilian supplies was given to OPACS as an insurance that the views of the priorities officials would not be carried to their ultimate conclusion in the total elimination of civilian supply. Yet the present arrangement is not a real substitute for a centralized administration of priorities. The larger part even of civilian supplies is in many cases really for indirect military use, and a division of authority in allocation results in endless confusion.

The Office of Price Administration in OPACS suffers from the same illogical development. It would not have been set up outside of the OPM if the OPM had done its job. Prices, production and priorities are so interdependent that they are almost inseparable, but today, OPACS and the Production and the Priorities Division are as often as not working at cross purposes.

The officials of the OPM have realized how serious the lack of coördination is, and they are today engaged in reorganizing the OPM on an industry basis. In the new structure of the OPM which may be reached within the next two months Stettinius, Biggers and Nelson will remain in charge of the Priorities, Production and Procurement Divisions and will retain small staffs to administer problems of general procedure. But the lower units of each division will be brought together on an industry basis. Each industry unit will deal with priorities, production and procurement problems, but not with price and labor problems. The units will be divided into three groups, directed by Stettinius, Biggers and Nelson. They will be divided in such a way that the industries in which problems of priorities are predominant will be placed under Stettinius; those in which production problems are predominant will be under Biggers; and those in which procurement problems are predominant will be under Nelson. But since priorities must be of increasing importance as the diversion of resources grows more widespread, Stettinius, as Priorities Administrator, will have direct entrance to all three groups.

Each unit will have attached to it two committees: a committee of business men within the industry which will be purely advisory; and a coördinating committee consisting of representatives of other government agencies including OPACS and the Labor Division of the OPM. Labor advisory committees will also be established and have already been partially organized in the electrical, rubber and aircraft industries. Philip Murray, however, has denounced these committees as poor substitutes for the industry councils of his own plan in which labor and business representatives are given power to administer prices, production and priorities. Murray recently described the labor advisory committees of the OPM reorganization plan as "mere tinsel, mere window dressing," and advised CIO officials to refuse to serve on them.

Whether or not the Murray plan is wiser, it is clear that the present reorganization is insufficient. It does not reallocate authority between the OPM and the War and Navy Departments, and it does not integrate price policies with those of production and priorities; it is simply a reshifting within the OPM; a move in the right direction and no more.

Any real reorganization of the defense administration must work toward three objectives. First, since the best organization will fail if it is staffed by poor personnel, the proved failures that remain in the OPM must be cleaned out and replaced on the basis of strict adherence to the rule that while advice must be expert, administration must be independent. A clean broom would sweep before it not only such men as Meigs and the spokesmen for special interests, such as Ralph Budd, but two of the three key figures in the OPM, Biggers and Stettinius. Biggers today may concede his past errors and promise that the next Hundred Days will not be like the last. "It is a characteristic of drunkards and other addicts," said The London Economist recently, "that they are perpetually on the point of turning over a new leaf; their latest aberration is always their last one. When this trait appears in the sober and responsible sphere of public policy, it is even more deplorable."

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Second, the OPM must be transformed into a real Ministry of Supply, like that of the British, which has full responsibility for procurement and production.

Third, we should be working toward the integration of authority under the still unformed Office of Emergency Management. The conservatives of America have understood this need for integration and they have filled the press with the clamor for a "defense Tsar," which is principally a subterfuge for an attempt to seize complete control of the administration and raise a figure to challenge even the President's authority. A real reorganization of the defense administration is the best defense we could have against the growing agitation of these groups.

"We have been borrowing time from the British," said Secretary Ickes on July 14, "but we have no right to borrow any more." If we stop deceiving ourselves by words like "defense"; if we speak instead of the final superb chance to smash Hitler that the Soviet resistance has given us; then reorganization is even more urgent as the precondition of swift, all-out action.

Washington MICHAEL STRAIGHT

Can Russia Strike Back?

IN OBSERVING THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR the examination of facts is more important than the voicing of predictions. The first factor to be checked is the reliability of statements from the two belligerents. The Soviet communiqués do not reveal everything—probably they understate Soviet losses to some extent; but the German communiqués report events that are outright impossibilities. They claimed the destruction of 7,000 Russian planes in the first three weeks, the larger part on the ground. Such a claim is fantastic. The German Luftwaffe has been unable to destroy the ground organization of British aviation. Yet British air bases are concentrated in a very limited space, while Russian bases are decentralized over vast areas and organized in depth. Russian practice is to keep pursuit planes at an average of 130 miles behind the front, light bombers at 230 miles and heavy bombers at 300 to 350 miles. The Germans have acknowledged the high skill of the Russians in camouflaging military objectives—a skill that must surely extend to air bases. German surprise successes against Russian aviation on the ground can have been attained at best only during the first twenty-four hours, for aircraft usually shift their stations immediately after the first assault.

What about the relative size of the two air forces at the start of the second war month? We have one important German admission: at the outbreak of the war Red aviation had numerical superiority. Since German reports of Russian plane losses are quite evidently exaggerated, one can only conclude that the Germans have at best reached parity, though perhaps even now they may lag quantitatively behind the Russians. As for the German claims to qualitative superiority, they require one important corrective element. It is probable that the German Luftwaffe has a higher percentage of planes of the very latest types. To prove its superiority, German reports have compared the Messerschmitts to the Russian pursuit craft of the J 15 and J 16 types. These types, however, are of 1935-36 vintage, and the equipment of the Soviet air force has since been modernized. The greater part of Soviet aviation is qualitatively equal to the German. In this connection the outstanding quality of Russian fliers must also be taken into account—their courage, thorough training and technical skill.

As for the Russian tank arm, there can be no doubt of its numerical superiority. According to Russian statements, some 10,000 German tanks are now engaged at the front. According to the German General Guderian, Germany's leading authority in matters of tank warfare, the Red Army is supposed to have possessed 10,000 tanks and armored cars as early as the end of 1935. In my book, "Battle for the World," I placed probable Red Army tank superiority at 2 to 1, compared to the Wehrmacht, and that view is now shared by so cautious and expert an observer as Major George Fielding Eliot in The New York Herald Tribune. Generally speaking, the war began with a numerical superiority on the part of the Wehrmacht at the front, since the German forces were fully mobilized and all available German reserves had been thrown into the Eastern front. There is this difference between the First and Second World Wars: in 1914-17 at best one-third of the German army was engaged against Russia (during the great 1915 offensive); but today Russia has to bear the full brunt of the German war machine. In the course of the campaign army mass proportions are inevitably bound to develop in favor of the Red Army. At the beginning of the war the proportion at the front was about 1.5 to 1 in favor of Germany. But the Red Army at the front is receiving a constant influx of reserves, chiefly from the northern Caucasus, from the Volga and from central Russia. To this must be added the uninterrupted series of mobilized divisions. At the conclusion of mobilization the numerical proportion may well be 2 to 1 in favor of the Red Army.

The character of the battle area lends a peculiar stamp to this campaign. Territorial losses have cost the Red Army its advanced theatre of war—such approaches to the Balkans and Central Europe as it controlled. The Red air force has lost its advanced bases,

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shortening the range of Soviet bombardment aviation by some three hundred miles. The Red Army supply bases lying immediately behind the old Soviet-Polish border are now exposed to German attack, and some Russian centers are menaced. But this retreat has brought the Red Army the advantage of fighting on its own terrain where communication lines are shorter and there is a better chance for counter-offensive than on the German-Soviet border on the Bug and San. The relentless advance of the Wehrmacht has conquered large territories, but it has also extended communication lines and placed bases on devastated soil. No longer does the Wehrmacht have the advantage in transport facilities. The rail net in its former base territory in Poland and Rumania and its present one in conquered Russian land are no denser than that of Russia's interior. On the contrary, the railways of the German bases have been laid waste by war operations, guerrilla warfare and sabotage, whereas Russian railways have had to suffer only from German aerial bombardment. More than ever the Wehrmacht is dependent on motorized transport. But in this respect the Red Army has the better of it, for it has far more motorized equipment and incomparably greater fuel reserves. The Wehrmacht must maneuver under heartbreaking conditions in areas a thousand miles long and several hundred miles deep, and its tasks grow to gigantic proportions because it faces virtually no tangible objectives.

Of the Russian centers Leningrad is most seriously menaced. Leningrad is economically important as a center of the shipbuilding and electrical industries. But from the viewpoint of war economy in a great land and air war, it is not of great value. The closest centers vital to war lie 200 miles southeast of Kiev—the iron-ore deposits of Krivoi-Rog, the country's greatest power plant at Dnieprostroy and the machine-tool industries of Dniepropetrovsk. Along this line the most powerful Soviet resistance is sure to be encountered.

Thus German strategy faces a task that is difficult even for motorized warfare. The rate of the German advance has slowed down noticeably. The average German advance along the entire front reached a depth of 180 miles in the first week, while during the ensuing three weeks a further depth of 150 miles was reached only in a northeasterly direction. On the central and southeastern fronts it was limited to an average of 100 miles. It is not known, as these lines are written, how deep the break-through at Smolensk will penetrate. And here is the outstanding factor: in the fourth week of the war the front ran almost vertically, without break-through and encirclement operations. The plan of the battle of annihilation by encirclement, executed in Poland and in the West in twelve days, in the Balkans in a single week, was never carried out during the first four weeks on the eastern front.

The first phase of Soviet strategy was an orderly retreat; the second, active defense. For the moment the Red Army command holds two trump cards—an uninterrupted influx of reserves and a methodical combat strategy of effective defense. This active defense takes full advantage of all natural obstacles and fortification lines, and it is conducted with a combination of all arms branches. Soviet war doctrine provides a highly developed method of modern defense, and Red Army units have been carefully trained for this purpose. On this subject Krasnaya Svesda (Red Star), organ of the Soviet General Staff, wrote on September 18, 1940: "In modern war the defender who has sufficient reserves and is well armed with tanks and aviation can stop operations by the attacker's tank units and liquidate break-throughs." The procedure consists of encircling with motorized infantry and mechanized artillery the enemy tanks that have broken through, striking them from the air, and finally annihilating them with the aid of counter-attacking tanks. It is a defense that employs all the offensive arms. One great advantage possessed by the Red Army over the French army in this respect is its strength in mobile reserves.

The war in the East will be waged in an unbroken series of battles, without let-up. Both sides will put forth supreme efforts. But while the Russians will strive to economize on their forces, so far as the situation permits, in order to enable them to gather great strategic reserves for the counter-offensive, Germany is likely to continue with an offensive strategy at all costs. The German High Command will cling to the attempt to join a battle of annihilation, come what may. It must quickly attain the maximum of success at any price. So far German successes have been the result of the greater operative preparedness of the fully mobilized Wehrmacht, of carefully prepared numerical superiority in chosen directions, and of the German troops' greater war experience. Once the Red Army has evened the score in the matter of experience, it is likely to become capable of launching a counter-offensive. In this war of movement through vast spaces there can be no stabilization of the front for any length of time. There may be a temporary stalemate whenever the two sides exert equal pressure on the front lines. But neither side will be able to remain on the defensive. There can be no doubt that the Red Army High Command, despite the critical situation at the front, and whatever the German successes are likely to be, desires the counter-offensive and has the reserves and technical resources to launch one. (The bulk of Russia's bombardment aviation has not been put into action so far.) Unquestionably superhuman efforts are being put forward in Russia to concentrate forces for such a purpose. The test of the Red Army's quality will come only when it proves or disproves its capacity for launching a counter-offensive.

MAX WERNER

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Price Control in England

THE RISE IN PRICES during the First World War made its successful ending for Great Britain a Pyrrhic victory. Not only was the country's internal return to peacetime conditions seriously hampered, but, what was still more harmful, England found it extremely difficult to recapture her export markets, especially in competition with countries like Japan. England's traditional, low-wage domestic-economy system had been all but destroyed, and her ability to turn out low-priced goods for the export trade seriously impaired.

To prevent a recurrence of a similar situation in the event of another war, a plan to control prices had been formulated in peacetime which was put into motion in September, 1939. Yet prices advanced more in the first four months of the present war than they did in the first fifteen of the last, and while the climb of soaring prices has not been so steep, after the first hectic months, percentage levels are still higher after twenty-two months than for a comparative period in the last war, and the trend is still upward.

The Cost of Living Index (retail prices) of the British Ministry of Labor stood, at the latest report, at 198 against 155 on September 1, 1939, or a rise of 43 points. In a comparative period in the last war it rose from 100 in August, 1914, to 135-140 in April, 1916. Nor is the rise confined to retail prices. It covers the whole field. For example, the London Economist Index of Wholesale Prices on May 26, 1941, shows the textile group at 92 against 54.3 on August 30, 1939, and minerals at 129.6 against 77.6, respectively.

Three agencies in England are mainly charged with controlling prices—the Ministry of Supply, whose province is raw materials; the Ministry of Food, which looks after foodstuffs; and the Board of Trade, the special interest of which is retail prices other than food. All three can be charged with exercising their powers in a piecemeal, haphazard and half-hearted fashion.

The Ministry of Health made its contribution to price control in one bold decisive action. On September 1, 1939, a Rent Restrictions Act was rushed through Parliament and became immediately effective the next day. It froze solid the rents of all dwellings in the working or lower-middle-class categories at prevailing levels for the duration of the war and for six months after. Rents in this war have not been a factor in the rise in the cost of living. The other Ministries in their effort to find an effective method of price control could have taken the renting act as a guide.

The Ministry of Supply, a comparatively new agency set up after Germany's invasion of Czecho-Slovakia, placed only certain materials under control immediately upon the outbreak of the war, although it had under its jurisdiction all raw materials necessary for the national defense.

For example, wool was controlled but not cotton; steel but not tin. Rubber, a most important war material, was not controlled. Maximum prices were established for the controlled products, the government itself, in many cases, entering into long-term contracts as purchasing agent, especially in the case of imported goods. The basis for establishing a maximum price varied with different commodities. That for imported wool was fixed at 30 percent above pre-war prices, but domestic wool at a lower figure; non-ferrous metals at pre-war figures; petroleum products at Gulf prices. In Germany, maximum prices were uniformly fixed for all commodities at levels prevailing in August, 1939.

The Minister of Supply soon found that his attempt at stabilizing prices of raw materials was like trying to reach an oasis in a mirage. The costs of manufacturing were continually rising, partly because of his own short-sighted policy of not controlling the whole field but also through circumstances for which he was not responsible.

Prices of imported raw materials were particularly susceptible to upward revision either because of a change in the price in the country of origin or because intensified war risks raised freight costs or insurance rates. To control prices in the country of origin the government tended more and more to enter the purchasing field, replacing private purchases with long-term government contracts.

The Ministry's efforts to stabilize prices of materials purchased from domestic sources were also partly vitiated by circumstances beyond its control. For example, the December, 1939, prices of domestic wool had to be revised to a figure 30 to 40 percent higher in July, 1940, because another government department had by a statutory enactment established a higher minimum wage for all agricultural laborers.

The experience of the Ministry of Food almost parallels that of the Ministry of Supply. At the outbreak of the war the Minister of Food froze what he chose to call *basic* foodstuffs virtually at the prices prevailing on August 29, 1939. The last war should have taught him that to call any foodstuff basic is a most arbitrary procedure. As shortages develop in so-called basic foodstuffs, substitutes gradually replace them, and if prices are uncontrolled they tend to soar. The new recruits to the class of basic foodstuffs had to have their prices stabilized at a figure infinitely higher than if control had been applied at the beginning simultaneously to all foodstuffs. At last, twenty-two months too late, price control has been applied to almost everything that could be considered edible.

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Food prices, according to the Department of Labor's Index, have risen thirty-two points since the war began. This figure is entirely misleading, as it does not take into account the government's policy of subsidizing certain foodstuffs such as flour and milk so as to prevent a rise to the consuming public. In 1941 these subsidies will amount to not less than £100,000,000, or roughly $500,000,000, which must be considered in evaluating Britain's campaign to control food prices.

The Board of Trade entered the price-control picture two months after the war began, when it was discovered that, in spite of the efforts of the Ministers of Supply and Food and notwithstanding the fact that rents had been stabilized, living costs were getting out of hand. Retailers were making hay while the sun of non-control shone on those particular fields not watched by these two Ministers.

Parliament, therefore, passed in November, 1939, the Price of Goods Act which it was thought would put a stop to soaring retail prices. It was a compromise piece of legislation. After December 30, 1939, it would be a penal offense, for which the retailer might have to serve five years in jail, to sell certain price-regulated goods above the basic price on August 21, 1939, plus a permitted increase made necessary by additional costs due to increases since August, 1939, in about eight factors affecting the retail product being sold, *e.g.*, additional manufacturing costs, increase in salaries of salesmen, additional insurance costs, etc.

The retail prices of about three hundred articles, chiefly bought by the persons in lower income brackets, were thereby brought under control. The application of the Act to only a part of the retail field did not prevent prices rising in general and in June, six months later, the application of the Act had to be extended to cover almost the whole field of retail sales. The way in which the term "permitted increase" has been interpreted has finally forced the government to call for a new Act of Parliament which will permit it to fix a maximum retail price for any product irrespective of any retailer's plea for a permitted increase.

One illustration of the government's difficulties with the old Price of Goods Act was the case of a retailer who sold a civilian steel helmet with a basic manufacturing cost of four and a half pence (roughly nine cents) at seventeen shillings and sixpence (roughly four dollars). It had passed through so many hands and different companies from the time it left the manufacturer that it reached the retailer at a price of fourteen shillings and sixpence ($3.25). All the middlemen's profits under the patchwork Price of Goods Act of November, 1939, were "permitted increases" and the retailer's price of seventeen shillings and sixpence for a four-and-a-half-pence article was not an exorbitant one so long as the middlemen were not corporate reflections of the retailer, which, in a good many instances, is not unlikely.

Retailed goods in future will reach the consumer at a figure within speaking distance of their manufactured costs and there will be no string of middlemen to interpret the speaking. It will be a case not of "Let the buyer beware" but of "Middlemen lay off."

Great Britain has by experiment and failure discovered that price control cannot be applied piecemeal and she has finally extended the operation of maximum prices to almost every product. Wages, however, are still subject to provisions made in peacetime which have no relation to the actualities of wartime.

This is the principal reason why products which are of a purely domestic origin have followed the procession of advancing prices. Coal has advanced 34 percent in price because miners' wages have been raised on five different occasions until they are now roughly 40 percent higher than in August, 1939. The prices of domestic agricultural products show about the steepest of all advances, with an average of 60 percent. A national minimum wage has been established for the farm laborer, to make him stay on the farm and not migrate to war industries, and the farmer himself is the recipient of many subsidies. Cement, another purely domestic product, is up 20 percent because of the wage factor. Indeed, England is finding price stabilization an almost insoluble problem because of a peculiar arrangement regarded as a triumph of labor in peacetime.

About one-quarter of Great Britain's estimated 21,000,000 wage earners automatically have trade-union wage agreements which call for an upward wage revision as soon as prices rise. Some are based on a sliding scale anchored to the cost-of-living index, and others on the selling price of the products of the industry involved. Linked to these union workers who have their wages fixed automatically by either of these two formulas is another quarter of the wage earners of Great Britain. While not unionized, they have friendly understandings with their employers, so that their wages will as a matter of course follow those of kindred trades which are subject to a sliding-scale formula. Therefore, roughly one-half of England's wage earners are at any time liable to be affected by any change in the price structure.

In the first three months of 1941 almost as many workmen had their wages raised as in 1940—5,200,000 against 5,500,000—which resulted in a weekly additional wage bill of £770,000 against £850,000 the year before, and 45 percent of these raises were automatically linked to a cost of living or some other sliding-scale formula.

The story of England's attempt at price control is not complete without mentioning that rationing is being more and more used in this war, not, as in the last, for purposes of spreading out shortages, but as a pure deterrent to buying. The stringent clothes rationing of June 1 is claimed to be chiefly part of this policy. What the ultimate effect will be on those industries which

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are the victims only time will tell. Habits of thrift may be inculcated in a people from which it may take a generation to recover. Queen Victoria's widowhood left an imprint of somberness on English women's styles which made Paris and not London the fashion center of the world, although the making of good textile materials was England's prerogative.

To sum up, it can be fairly said that England's efforts at price control so far have not been too successful. The price rise is greater than in a comparative period in the last war when there were practically no artificial restrictions. Germany's price rise is only four points against England's forty-three, but then Germany's ruthless uniform stabilization of wages at 1936 levels and prices at August, 1939, levels were not practicable in a democracy, which Britain, even in spite of increasing self-imposed war restrictions, continues to be.

Nevertheless, England's experience thus far proves that price control is not "to be enterprised nor taken in hand inadvisedly, lightly or wantonly" as a remedy against the sin of inflation. It cannot be effective if it is a matter of patchwork edicts haphazardly applied to separate segments of the price structure at odd moments as the spirit moves. To be successful, control must be applied to the whole structure, ruthlessly and simultaneously, lest the uncontrolled part vitiate the effort in the controlled and a weak section cause the whole edifice to topple. Wages must also be recognized to be a part of the price structure.

Total war does not circumscribe its destructiveness and the trade-union leader should consider himself as much part of the fighting mechanism of his country as the soldier in the front line. Labor must, therefore, not expect to retain all the hard-won privileges of peacetime under the duress of war, and must be willing to submit to temporary control if the interest of the whole body politic demands it. But it cannot be expected to do so if capital and management do not submit to similar sacrifices. That is another story, which is not pertinent here.

A. WYN WILLIAMS

If the Red Army Loses

WHAT IS IT that Hitler is trying to do in Soviet Eurasia? To destroy the Red Army (in order to be free to seek a quick decision over Britain)? To develop large new sources of supply on Soviet territory (for a long war with Britain and the United States)? To wipe communism from the map of two continents? There must have been long speculation on these matters in the limpid upper air of Berchtesgaden; and even now, at "the Führer's Headquarters" in the steppes, the debate may still be going on.

Whatever may come after, the destruction of the main body of the Red Army is necessarily the first objective; and there are several ways in which the Red Army might try to save itself, and to turn the tide against the invader. It might attempt a war of position, a static defense; but all the experience of the battles of Flanders and of France is against it, and the Soviet forces are equipped and trained for quite another sort of war. Another plan very frequently mentioned as practicable is one of deliberate retreat, with a wholesale devastation of the abandoned territory. This was the policy that saved the Russian army in 1812—kept it in being for its eventual counter-attack against Napoleon; and it was this policy that saved the bulk of the Russian army in 1915, and thus permitted the powerful Brusilov offensive of the following year. But there are grave reasons for doubting that such a policy can save the Soviet army today. The most important of these reasons is a technical one—the speed and the striking power of the dive-bomber and the tank, and the vulnerability of infantry and artillery to the headlong attack of these new types of cavalry. The mass of every army is still infantry and artillery, and no country has motors enough or roads enough to move a mass army backward as rapidly as an armored attack moves forward. The tanks and planes of the retreating army cannot be strong enough everywhere to meet the quickly concentrated attacks of pursuing tanks and bombers; and infantry and artillery moving in retreat, congested on the roads and deprived of cover and camouflage, are far more vulnerable to tank and plane attack than when they are deployed in the field. If a mass army in open country cannot save itself by combining holding actions with counter-attacks by its own tanks and dive-bombers, it seems improbable that it can save itself by a wholesale retirement. All this should be put most tentatively, of course, since the only opinion of value on such a subject is the opinion of a military expert. But on the basis of the news, it appears that the Red Army is committed, not to indefinite retreat, but to defense in depth and to counter-attack with every resource at its command.

Fighting on this planetary scale seems likely to produce a major decision at a fairly early date. If this decision goes against the Soviet power, it is not improbable that the question of a Russo-German peace by compromise will immediately be raised. If Hitler wants, most of all, to rush his army westward to the English Channel and across, for a quick decision in the West, an Eastern peace by compromise will probably be his choice. If he feels the need of new sources of supply for a long war in the West, an Eastern compromise would still promise to serve him best—for the duration of the Western fight. He and his advisers can hardly fail to see that a displacement of the present leader-

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ship in Russia and a wholesale reorganization of the economic system would involve prodigious responsibilities, difficulties and delays. Thus, in spite of Hitler's proclamation of a crusade against communism (once before proclaimed, and once before abandoned), and in spite of his undoubted fear of the continued existence of a socialist state as a center of international infection, he would probably offer to a defeated Russia a peace that would leave the USSR intact in leadership and in internal organization, perhaps even largely intact in territory, on condition of demobilization, disarmament and the delivery of a heavy share of the output of Soviet economy to Germany (whatever might be the economic burden upon the citizens of the Union). One superlative advantage of such an arrangement is, of course, that it would leave Russia tied to the block, as France now is, ready for any further terms that Hitler might ultimately inflict upon her if Germany should win the war in the West.

And what answer would the Soviet government make to such a proposal as this? Would it be argued, in favor of acceptance, that Britain and the United States had left the Red Army to fight alone? (There is only one way to answer this argument, and that is by action, now. To be sure, the Red Army would not have fought alone if it had marched against Germany a year ago, when the French and British armies were in full action in the West. But let us be realistic, just this once: How far will a reminder of this fact go toward persuading our new Soviet allies to go on fighting, if their army cracks and a German peace is offered in Moscow? And how far will the new Anglo-Soviet pact go, in the same direction and under the same circumstances?) Also in favor of the acceptance of the German offer would be the fact that it would leave the Soviet leaders at their desks—though nothing would be made of this, publicly, in Moscow. But for many a devoted citizen of the Soviet Union, the strongest point in favor of a compromise would be the hope that it would preserve the socialist system against some future day of liberation from the German tribute.

On the other hand, any such German proposal would have about it something of the odor of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939; it would be a truce, terminable at the will of the German non-aggressor-pro-tem. Moscow would perhaps understand this; and it might also be understood there that the acceptance of another such pact would do further serious damage to the influence of the Soviet Union in radical circles abroad. But the strongest argument of all against any new deal with Germany would be, perhaps, the possibility that such a bargain, coupled with the defeat of the army, might bring on a considerable revolt against the Soviet government itself.

But suppose the army should be defeated, and Stalin should still refuse a compromise. Or suppose Hitler should decide to offer none, but to perform at once his promise of a root-and-branch extermination of communism. On these terms, Hitler might find a limited amount of support within the Soviet Union—some discontented separatists among the national-minority groups, some peasants who have never accepted collective agriculture; but many Russians who dislike the revolutionary system would dislike the hob-nailed Nazis even more. In the history of the various fights with foreign intervention in the early days of Soviet history, there are many instances of Russians who, in denial of their every feeling except their patriotism, volunteered for service against the invaders.

The purges of 1936-38 produced evidences of disloyalty on the part of a number of the leaders of the Soviet Union—leaders severely disciplined and highly selected through years of service in the Communist Party and the government. If this was the case within this selected class, it can hardly be supposed that the masses were or are entirely free from taint. But it is hardly to be doubted that the revolutionary spirit and the patriotic spirit, coöperating in the same cause, would align a great majority of the people against Hitler. The defeat of the Russian army—if it should come to that—would put these people to the hardest test that can be set upon a nation. It seems extremely unlikely that if the great army in European Russia meets defeat, it will be possible to maintain other armies or a recognized national government in any quarter of the country; in The New Republic of a week ago, Edgar Snow expressed the belief that this could be done—but given a concentrated target of this kind, German tanks and planes would probably provide the opposite answer. On the other hand, an attempt of the Germans and their local allies to carry out some sort of counter-revolution in thousands of industrial plants and tens of thousands of collective farms would probably meet with such resistance, passive and active—sabotage, dynamiting, bridge blowing, train wrecking, ambush fighting, assassination—that considerable German forces would have to be maintained within the country for a long time to come, and almost no goods could be got out for just as long as that.

Thus it seems probable that only a compromise peace with the Soviet Union can give Hitler what he wants, when he wants it. Only a compromise, with demilitarization, will fully liberate his Eastern army. Only a compromise, with the Soviet system left intact, will keep production going and provide a flow of goods to Germany. Such a compromise would, of course, be a disaster to Britain and the United States. What is to be done about it, then? There is no use being pious, and pretending that it cannot happen; it has already happened—in the Soviet-German pact of 1939. There is no use addressing moral lectures to the Soviet government, now or later, about loyalty to the common cause. They care nothing for our morality; their soldiers are dying by tens of thousands in this fight; and how shall we make it a common cause anyhow, except by common action?

GEROID TANQUARY ROBINSON

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Washington Notes

Russia One Month After

HOW RUSSIA IS FARING in the clash of arms with Germany is still disputed among United States army observers as the first month of the invasion draws to a close. Communiqués from both sides obviously are exaggerated and distorted to the point of meaninglessness. Information from our own embassy in Moscow is necessarily meager. Russian admissions of territory lost seem to be the best index of German progress. From these it can be gathered that the Nazis' gains are almost as impressive as they were against the Low Countries and France.

But territory is less important in the wide-open spaces of Russia than it was in the clutter of Western Europe. Tanks that flanked the Maginot Line found themselves within striking distance of Paris. Tanks that outrun their supply lines in Russia find themselves nowhere. So long as there is guerrilla fighting behind the mechanized advance units, territorial gains are not secure. There are indications that this kind of fighting is going on far behind the most advanced German spearheads. How long it can go on depends upon civilian and military morale. They have seemed to be good. But the reassignment of political commissars to the army was considered a bad sign here.

It seems to be the consensus of the experts, such as they are, that Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev will have to be sacrificed. But even with them gone, the Russian cause is not hopeless. The government can withdraw to the East and the fight can go on as long as Russia has an organized army. What with remnants saved from the Western campaign and reserves, it is assumed that a defensive front can be established behind Moscow.

Every day that the fight goes on and every German squad and German tank destroyed is so much net gain for the foes of Hitler. However much they disagree about the ultimate outcome of the campaign, military observers agree that it has been costly to the Germans—probably much more costly than they expected. The notion that the German army can again be turned West and with renewed vigor this year is generally discounted.

Regardless of the military outcome, Hitler already has lost his diplomatic war with Russia. His crusade against "godless communism," it can now be said, has utterly failed to enlist the forces he hoped it would bring into his camp. There is still confusion in the United States, but no more and perhaps less than there was before the Russian invasion. The Catholic clergy, by and large, has refused to be taken in by Hitler's crusader trappings. So have the political tories. If Hitler has strengthened himself with the British rightists, they are making no show of their conversion. This time his strategy of confusion seems to have been most successful in Germany, whence reports of dissension in high places continue to leak out.

Commissars may or may not be needed on the fighting front. Where they patently are needed is in the United States. The Communist Party has officially designated Charles Lindbergh an enemy of the people. Yet its members and friends in the CIO continue to coöperate with John L. Lewis, whose isolationism is almost identical with Lindbergh's and who frequently has praised Lindbergh's speeches in conversations with his associates. Further, Harry Bridges, the party liners' most admired hero in the American trade-union movement, bends the party line with public declarations of scorn for Great Britain. His deviation may be only a stratagem dictated by his desire to avoid deportation as a Communist, but whatever its purpose, it is confusing to the travelers trying to find out what to think now.

The meeting of the CIO Executive Council, scheduled for last week, was postponed indefinitely because of the illness of President Philip Murray. It now seems probable that a showdown among the Communist, the Lewis and the Hillman forces will be delayed until fall. That will give all elements time to get themselves oriented to the new world situation. Lewis' friends meanwhile are going on with their campaign for the chief's restoration. Speaking before the Indiana CIO convention, Ora Gassaway, one of Lewis' handymen, expressed the opinion that the head of the CIO, in times like these, should be a native-born American. (Murray was born in Scotland.) He was booed by the delegates.

Harry Hopkins' mission in London is to find out, not so much what the British need, as what they can get along without in the next few weeks. He is trying to persuade the British High Command that some of the materiel on order for England should be diverted to Chungking, Vladivostok and Batavia. Administration leaders are convinced that Japan can be sterilized, so far as her usefulness to the Axis is concerned, by encirclement with airplanes in the hands of the Russians and Dutch as well as the Americans and British.

Many Americans are going to find out, for the first time, that the American defense effort involves something more than higher wages, bigger profits and general prosperity when Congress starts debating the Henderson price-fixing bill. That is why the administration has been so hesitant about bringing it forward. Data supporting the legislation will disclose that widespread, if temporary, unemployment must be expected as plants shift over from civilian to military production; that wages and farm prices as well as profits must be held below certain fixed ceilings; and that the penalty for refusal to submit to government regulation of unprecedented scope will be a disastrous price inflation. In fact, the country will make the unpleasant discovery that it must share with the British, if not the blood, at least the sweat and the tears that go with the fight for world decency.

The Soviet Embassy in Washington is now distributing daily a mineographed handout containing the communiqués, statements of prominent Russians and other propaganda material. The stuff comes from Moscow by wireless and apparently is about as much as correspondents can get in Moscow.

Washington T. R. B.

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Garson's Guard

GARSON KANIN wouldn't say anything much when he was working on the picture. "Oh, it will be a sort of cute story, I guess. Who's going over to Lucey's for some drinking fluid?" Kanin likes to fight something through and get something done that is not considered do-able, but he was low-rating his "Tom, Dick and Harry" nevertheless. It is what is known technically as a honey of a picture. On the surface it is little or nothing; under the surface it is little or nothing. But from the way it was devised and made it has a sweetness of its own, a foolish but endearing truth.

It is a Ginger Rogers picture and sensibly exploited as such. But while it is true that with almost any other acting lady the central part would have faded and frayed, exploitation has nothing whatever to do with any sense of values in the world: the only true thing to say is that here is a piece of light-comedy writing through which a group of actors move in natural and happy ease, the whole thing being made actual through one man's taste, judgment and willing ear, cheerful spirits and shrewd theatre knowledge.

Paul Jarrico's story has for its only basis the problem of the young working girl, a shrewd enough number to take care of herself with some to spare, but a pushover for the romantic things about romance. She is proposed to by three men in fairly rapid succession, the go-getter, the happy-go-lucky-go-flat-broke, the young heir. She naturally accepts them all and comes to like them, but the rich one is the only one she was aiming at, and really trying. Still, it is a problem to choose just one with all three right there waiting. So she finally hares off with the one you'd expect, though there was a bad minute for a moment. I told you it was nothing.

But while the conflict is basically old, Jarrico never gave it a wink of sleep from beginning to end. There is the business of a girl's dreams done in the fantasy of cartoons. (For once in a hundred, Vernon Walker's special effects were special and effective.) There is one lover played neatly against another, those two against the third, then all three tossed in the same blanket. There is the quickening realism of the switchboard and its possibilities. There are the brat of a sister; Betty Breckenridge parlaying a bit part into a neat performance; Phil Silvers as the friendless good-humor man; even Sidney Skolsky in a magnificent interpretation of seven words all different. What with cars, planes, streets, rooms and bowling alleys, there is a good sense of motion though it is essentially a dialogue plot. And part of the smooth running may be credited to the work of the several writers and assistants we may call Garson's Guard, though they are not billed as such, when billed at all.

There is a quality of the pleasantly absurd in understatement and the offhand, as in the afterthought of the two on the newest successful suitor: "Nice looking fellah."—"Yeah, uh huh. . . ." Or the father's switch from the shotgun when he finds the prospective cad is a millionaire instead, "What's she going to do about *shoes*, hurry up!" This has its sure effect on the audience, making the picture a thing of steady good humor rather than of scattered guffaws (the two places where they were stretching for laughs, the bowling-alley header and an ancient play on the word democratic, are out of key).

Probably more important, certainly more difficult to achieve, is a sustained matching of the gentle charm of fairy-tales with an everyday realism, so that people are delighted to identify themselves with the automobile salesman's prospect, the air of the family's living room after supper, the girl out of her depth in the bright life. There could be no better devising for such a film than that opening on a movie audience, far romance carried away from the screen to the ice-cream parlor afterward and into the humdrum of tomorrow's job. It is a definition of the word economy, it is a whole course in setting the mood with one chord. Then the single touch to show the boys have been waiting on those steps a long long time, one wanting to say something hateful but finding a frog in his throat as big as a pillow. The overlapping dialogue, especially as worked out by Miss Rogers and Meredith, is a release of the strained in itself—one talking and coming over clearly, the other following, anticipating, still objecting, the silly mumble and cross-purpose of all human exchange. Everything is done with such appreciation of the delicate fabric they were working in that there is nothing more natural than that someone should go off into dream fragments at any time.

This was in the writing and direction. But it is brought over most clearly to us with the people we see. With the one exception of Alan Marshal, who could be called a stick of wood except that he bends and opens the mouth, the cast seems to have been living there all its life. The good lord knows where she gets it, but Ginger Rogers has got every range of the working-girl character and a direct projection far ahead of the lines themselves; as I'm afraid I've said too many times, she has learned more of the right things faster than any actress today, and is still at it. George Murphy is exactly it for a part that could so easily have run off into the heavy-stupid or vice-versa. But the center of the frame belongs naturally to Miss Rogers and Burgess Meredith, who has never been quite so brash and yet appealing without a false note, the perfect Little Man, happy for nothing, wistful and right underneath and friends with the world. ("I don't believe in this every-man-for-himself: I get *lonesome*.") The best sequence in the picture and one of the best anywhere, for fun and poetry and all in proper ascension and beautiful timing, is his first date with the girl on a dollar-eighty, the walk home, the front steps in summer, these foolish things, etc. Garson's Guard in fact might as well include everybody on those sets, for that is the kind of thing it is, with the bloom on it. (P. S. You can't ad-lib bloom: the feeling must be there, and care too.)

There are a few weak points. Monkeyshines with the credit titles are getting out of control these days. Music as mimicry of voice or action is not good scoring; otherwise Roy Webb's background carries along. One special effect could have been spared us: the dissolve through a whirling image, which belongs in a Grantland Rice Sportlight. And the ending is just a little too abrupt; it has the necessary surprise, or punch, but it is not quite led up to, and sends them away on a somewhat lower note.

Of course it is true that our eaters of raw meat will be impatient with such frivolous verities as a young girl's dream of life, for these are times when we must be up and acting just as soon as ever we can get out of the swivel chair, in just a minute. But it was finished under Citizen Kanin's temporary deferment of induction into the actual armed, or non-swivel, forces—which I believe will enjoy such a show thoroughly wherever they may find themselves. And it is foot by foot the best-made picture of this year, if that means anything. OTIS FERGUSON

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The Bandwagon

Governor Eugene Talmadge liberalized his definition of "foreigner" today. A foreigner is not necessarily a non-native of Georgia, but "someone with different traditions, taught to believe that something is eternally right, such as racial equality." – *UP dispatch from Atlanta in The Wichita Eagle.*

The contract provided that the famous Ford service department operated by Bennett be eliminated and plant protection be taken over by employees identified by badges. Bennett said the "union's interpretation of a shop committeeman is my interpretation of a service man. That's why I agreed with the union to replace my service men."

The precautions taken at Bennett's office indicate the tension that existed in Detroit between the union and the company. The door to his office can be opened only by the operator of an electrical switchboard, and the windows are all firmly locked. – *From an interview with Harry Bennett printed in The Portland Oregonian.*

The House tonight killed a marriage health bill which would require blood tests of applicants for marriage licenses.

H. P. Lauf, Democratic floor leader of Cole County, denounced the measure as "vicious," declaring it violated the principles of religious freedom. – *AP dispatch from Jefferson City, Kansas, in The Kansas City Times.*

The 8,000-ton Terror was caught at dusk recently off the Libyan coast and made the target for 500-pound bombs. Her big and small guns put up a terrific barrage, causing the Germans to miss, but a near miss crumpled her amidships. – *AP dispatch from Alexandria in The New York Post.*

California, Here We Come!

The secret of the driving force behind the monstrous military machine of Nazism is sex. Before an invasion is planned, the Gestapo round up names, pictures and addresses of dancers, singers, chorus girls and beauties of the country to be invaded, and pass them around the barracks, and the boys all take their choice.

Having had their fill of Viennese and Parisian beauties, and those of other occupied countries, the Nazis are now casting lecherous and lustful eyes toward Hollywood. Each actress is labeled and tabbed for a rapacious invasion. – *From an article, "The Nazi Morons Eye Hollywood," in The Kapustkan (magazine).*

"Northwest Mounted Police"?

The Russians lie low [during Germany's new terror tactics of motorcycle troops riding wildly into the Russian lines] and encourage each other by saying, "Keep still. Make believe you are seeing the movies," Izvestia said. – *UP dispatch from Moscow in The New York Post.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. – THE EDITORS

Correspondence

British Imperialism

SIR: Recently I was listening to a radio account of the role of Indian troops in England's Syrian campaign. This imperialist use of the men and resources of India, in wars not at all India's own, has long been one of the outstanding indictments by Indian patriots of the British Empire.

My mind at once ran back to Sir Norman Angell's clever defense of the Empire in your issue of June 9. As an answer to specific exaggerations and misstatements about the crimes of Great Britain the article was correct. As a subtle piece of propaganda for the Empire and its virtues, it was exceedingly misleading.

Well informed foes of imperialism are concerned to prove on the record that British imperialism and its perpetuation, with or without our own country as senior partner (*vide* Henry Luce, Dorothy Thompson, *et al.*), is not the answer to the world's problems. Some of the comparative excellences of British imperialism (including certain acts of which Sir Norman boasts), as compared both with its own past and with German imperialism, are due to its relative weakness. The Empire as it has been cannot be maintained—certainly not without immensely costly American help, even in the unlikely event of a complete British victory.

At this point I accept Albert Viton's discerning classification of the Empire into concentric circles: Colonial, Indian, Dominion, Outer and Financial. Among them all, most of the world has been controlled.

The Colonial empire in Africa and the West Indies is a slum empire in which the native population and its resources have been completely and stupidly exploited under a government which may have been relatively free from personal tyranny, but which gave to the natives abject poverty without education or public-health facilities.

As for India, I wish I could be sure that all who read or hear Sir Norman Angell would read so temperate a statement of the Indian case as is to be found in the regular monthly bulletin, India Today, published at 17 East Forty-eighth Street, New York City.

I grant that the British dominions are free, except as they are financially dominated by British capital. But Britain's dominions, and the motherland, in the eyes of many of the disadvantaged peoples of the world, have no moral right to fence in so large a part of the earth's surface. Think, for instance, what the Australian immigration policy means to a crowded world in which seven million Australians, occupying a territory the size of the United States, will find so little room for any sort of immigrant.

To make my case would require more space than you ordinarily allot to letter writers. I am concerned to submit it in outline, not as an attack on England in her hour of peril, but as a warning against the growing danger that the only alternative offered to a Nazi victory will be a British victory underwritten by us on vague terms that not even the British Labor Party will define. That means English-speaking imperialism writ large. British, or more probably Anglo-American, imperialism in the middle of the twentieth century, if it is to endure at all, will have to be supported by great armaments and a fascist organiza-

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tion at home. It is Sir Norman Angell's virtue as a British propagandist, but not as a world thinker, that he sees so clearly that imperialism does not pay non-English-speaking peoples but is so skillful in extenuating it when it speaks the language of Shakespeare or, more accurately, Rudyard Kipling.

New York City NORMAN THOMAS

SIR: Mr. Norman Thomas does not cite a single specific instance in which my communication to you was "misleading." I was concerned mainly to point out that certain gross misrepresentations touching the constitutional position of the dominions, misrepresentations which serve admirably the purposes of German political strategy, are still widely current in America; that the truth in this respect is not a matter of opinion or debate but of simple statutory fact duly recorded in official documents, in acts and treaties.

I have never suggested anywhere, ever, that British imperialism is the answer to the world's problem. Indeed, I have spent nearly the whole of my writing life debunking the economic case for imperialism—for military conquest, that is. Those efforts have not been directed, as Mr. Thomas implies, to showing that the economic futility of conquest is confined to non-English-speaking peoples; my efforts have been directed particularly, almost entirely, to showing that it does not pay English-speaking peoples. The first book I ever wrote was a severe indictment of British foreign policy (as many of my books have been) and a very recent one is an indictment just as severe of Britain's refugee policy, and the immigration policy of the dominions.

My communication to you was in keeping with the position I have always held, namely, that wherever a tendency to abandon imperialism and to substitute internationalism for it reveals itself, the tendency should be welcomed and encouraged; not misrepresented. And I suggested that the development which had given to colonies or subject provinces, to a Canada or an Ireland, the status of independent states, was in fact if not in name a development toward internationalism.

In much of this discussion we are trapped by words, some of which in the passage of time have lost all precise meaning but still move us emotionally. We speak of the British "Empire." But over immense areas that empire has come to an end and been resolved into a voluntary association of states, of broadly equal status. Some such association for mutual defense (of much wider scope) there must be if human civilization is to protect itself against destruction by the violence of some fanatical and efficient Ku Klux Klan like that which now threatens us from Berlin. The alternative to imperialism is not anarchy, the chaos of independent units, each repudiating any obligation to take its part in resistance to such violence (with the result that a violent minority may dominate the majority). The proper alternative is internationalism. But all experience proves, alas, that nations are extremely rebellious to international collaboration. If old tradition and national symbols can be made to facilitate instead of obstruct such collaboration—and this seems to be the case in the coöperation of the now independent nations of the British Commonwealth—then it is common sense and the part of wisdom to utilize that fact and to try to make of what history has bequeathed to us the nucleus of a more extended internationalism.

That can never happen if we allow the facts about what we call the British Empire to be distorted. The effect of such distortion will be not to bring us nearer to internationalism but further from it; will be what the German political offensive in America aims at making it: the exchange of British for German imperialism. And that would not bring Indian or Colonial freedom nearer; it would make that end infinitely more remote.

Yet the friends of Indian freedom so often lend themselves to the maneuver whereby coöperation between the prospective victims of German aggression can be so delayed and hampered by stimulating suspicions, animosities, hates, as to be rendered ineffective, thus making it possible for a relatively small Nazi minority to impose itself upon a vast majority, by applying the most hackneyed device of tyranny: divide and rule.

The statement—not infrequently made in some quarters of late—that there is little to choose between British and German imperialism can be put to a simple test. For a century during which Britain held complete command of the sea, she had free access to the harbors of Canada alike on the Atlantic and the Pacific; as well as to harbors in the West Indies, Central America and even South America. Would America be prepared to see a Germany which had acquired as complete a command of the sea have free access to the Atlantic and Pacific harbors of Canada for all the armies she cared to transport, especially if that Germany had become the master of continental Europe, Africa, Russia and India? And would the three-thousand-mile border, which has been left completely undefended during a century and a quarter of British imperialism, remain undefended if Germany came to occupy the position which Britain occupied for a century?

To say or imply that the cause for which Canada, Britain, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Greece, Yugoslavia, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Russia, China, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa now fight is unworthy of support because India's progress toward dominion status is too slow, or because of the low standard of life in certain West Indian colonies, is about equivalent to saying that the United States might as well pass under Nazi rule because the Negro population of half a dozen Southern states have still to acquire their political rights, though subject to the draft and having to take their part in the country's defense, or because the sharecropper is still with us.

It is perhaps time we learned that to refuse to defend the good as against the bad because we cannot get the perfect is the way to get the worst. And it looks like being a very bad worst.

London, England NORMAN ANGELL

Antioch College

SIR: You may be interested in learning about certain ways in which Antioch College is taking the lead in the development of a realistic educational program, designed to train its students, through practical experience in the democratic process, for responsible leadership. I am not speaking of Antioch's coöperative job program, but of values which you alluded to in your editorial of June 16, "How the Strikers Get That Way"; in which you point out the need for the American educational system to develop in its graduates "a profound sense of community participation."

The use of this phrase caused tremendous pleasure among many members of the Antioch community because the words "community participation" have been in use at Antioch for a number of years. In fact, a Community Participation Committee has been in operation for some time, offering students the opportunity of contributing their services voluntarily to almost every phase of college life. At present, among other things, students are putting in more than a thousand hours of voluntary work in the renovation of an eighty-eight-year-old dormitory.

The spirit behind these words pervades every area of college activity and is instrumental in the development of attitudes in the students which are of great importance when they assume their responsibilities in the larger democratic society after graduation. With an increased desire to contribute something concrete toward their community, the students have more and more been assuming their share of responsibility in such functions as admissions, student counseling, curriculum and scholarship, and recently they have begun to take on their share of the college financial burden.

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This concept of education in which students are partners in (rather than recipients of) their education seems to us to be a truly democratic concept, the most dramatic outgrowth of which is a plan to send five undergraduate students to the West Coast this summer to acquaint a wider number of people with the Antioch plan, and to tell anyone who will listen why we believe it is of vital importance to the continued growth of American democracy.

A further aim is to relieve the administration of the complete financial burden. The students are realistic enough to realize that in any private college, and particularly a progressive one, their tuition does not pay the full costs of their education and that outside support is necessary. The student body has supported the trip by raising the necessary expenses. Coincidentally, we plan to spend about half our time in the vicinity of Los Angeles, and hope to be able to discuss our concept of community participation with many educational and civic groups.

JUNIUS EDDY, Antioch, '43

Antioch College, Yellow Springs, O.

Information on James Connolly

SIR: I am writing a life of James Connolly, the labor leader and Irish patriot who was executed after the Easter rising of 1916. From 1903 to 1910 he was active in the United States in the Socialist Labor Party, the Socialist Party and the IWW. I should be very glad to hear from those who knew him either here or abroad; anecdotes and personal correspondence would be particularly welcome. My address is 70 Phillips Street, Boston, Massachusetts.

Boston, Mass. SAMUEL LEVENSON

Soviet-American Soirée

SIR: Reading recent issues of The New Republic, I get the impression that the major problem of today is communism, and that you have settled down to meditating upon the fact that Stalin is a dirty stinker. I am not a Communist, and I have known well only one party member. But I think that your continual whimpering about the red menace is unfair and dangerous.

There is not, and never has been, any Communist menace in the United States. The myth that one exists is being promoted by our home-grown and imported Nazis. When you give exaggerated importance to the activities and opinions of a group which includes less than one-tenth of one percent of the population, and which has neither ample funds nor friends, you help Dies and Coughlin and all the rest of our domestic Hitlers.

As for Soviet foreign policy, I believe Russia chose between fighting Germany a year ago alone, and fighting Germany now, with the United States and England thoroughly committed to an anti-Nazi position. If Russia had fought a year ago, she would have fought as Spain fought: with help from England, France and the United States going to Hitler. By sheer luck we now have Britain, the USSR and the United States lined up at once against Hitler. It is the one perfect chance to stop the Nazis—and it may be our last if we muff it.

Hamilton, O. WILLIAM TAYLOR

[We don't know what paper Mr. Taylor has been reading, but we don't believe it can have been The New Republic. We have never said or suggested that the major problem of today is communism, and we deny that we have engaged in "continual whimpering about the Red menace." We think we have given the question of communism in America just about the amount of attention that it deserves. It has been more important than Mr. Taylor is willing to admit, or than the numbers of the Communists would suggest. This is true partly because the comrades are experts at publicity and partly because they have attained important positions in many unions engaged in defense efforts. Until June 22, when Hitler attacked Russia, they were doing everything they could to impede the American preparedness effort and to discourage our aid to England. The other reason Communists have an importance out of proportion to their numbers is that reactionaries fighting them also condemn and interfere with other people on the Left, including even the mildest liberals.

Mr. Taylor's last paragraph seems to us complete nonsense. We believe Stalin started the European war, through signing his pact with Hitler, in the hope that the Great Powers would exhaust themselves and let Russia alone. He wanted to stay out of the war indefinitely, and would have done so if Hitler had been open to appeasement, at any moment up to the time when the fighting began.—THE EDITORS]

Anti-Democrats in England

SIR: As an Englishman who wants to believe in the promise of a rebirth of democracy in Britain after the war, I regard the continuance of an honors list on the king's birthday with misgiving and dismay. It seems to me to be a promise of the perpetuation of the social and economic barriers in the Britain of tomorrow.

When the Labor people in the Cabinet speak to us in the papers and over the air about the new democratic spirit that has arisen in the land and of the discard of the Old School Tie in the affairs of government, we are carried away by the prospect. But the creation of so many more barons and knights is to my mind the negation of a genuine democratic trend.

Though the importance of the work being done by fellows like Tom Wintringham and Hugh Slater in building a people's army has compelled official recognition of their school at Osterley Park as an integral part of the defense mechanism of Britain, men like these are kept as much as possible in the background and the old diehards are apparently holding their own.

Will there be a longer "Court Circular" in The Times when the war is over, and shall we learn that Herr Goering and Herr Ribbentrop and Baron Ironside of Archangel are spending the grouse season with J. P. Morgan in Scotland? And will the gunner's mate who lost a leg in the action off Crete be selling The Evening Standard on the street? I ask you!

Preston Hollow, New York DONALD W. R. PACEY

From The New Republic Mail Bag

Mrs. Edward Jordan of Chicago wishes The New Republic had two issues a week. "I find many current and popular magazines extremely tame by comparison," she writes. "I have even taken to filing special articles."

Howard Meyer of Brooklyn condemns the City College "red" trials. He places the Schappes conviction "not as a perjury trial, but for other obvious reasons," in the same class with the Scottsboro, Mooney, and Sacco and Vanzetti "legal murders."

A. B. of Norris, Tennessee, sends us interesting material on the People's Opinion Poll, an organization proposing national Post Office or Census Bureau opinion polls of all registered voters, designed as advisory referenda on important congressional legislation.

"Does not the recent Ford-Lewis pact remind you strongly of another world-shaking pact of August, 1939?" asks Dorothy Canning of Menlo Park, California.

C. Violet Haywood of Upper Montclair, New Jersey, takes issue with "A British View of Union Now" (The New Republic, June 30). She claims the problem of political machinery, not the need for cultural ties with America, will prove to be the real stumbling-block.

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Veblen: Man from Mars

SATIRE has various devices for overcoming our hatred of hearing ourselves criticized. Sometimes, to be sure, when it speaks outright, truth alone seems its sufficient sword and shield; more often, it disarms us by aping the sacred madness of Don Quixote or by masquerading as fool and jester. The ironical satirist, on the other hand, dupes our resistance by a pretense of innocence. He disguises himself as our defender, or, at the very least, as a disinterested arbiter judiciously weighing the pros and cons of a problem. Instilling the narcotic of a false security, he thus subtly undermines our defenses, imperceptibly crumbles them away.

Thorstein Veblen as satirist remarkably combines some of these methods. In part he is the remote scholar, the skeptical scientist subjecting everything to the test of his laboratory apparatus and the tribunal of reason. In part he is a growling and surly old Norwegian uncle whose smelly pipe and acid home-truths we wonder at ourselves for putting up with. But this very harshness is in fact an ingratiatory device; the truculence of the critic convinces us of his honesty and courage. It arises only out of the ironic understatements that dissimulate his aims and enable him to imply that satire was far from being his purpose. So handled, the unveiling achieved seems less of his engineering than inherent in the circumstances themselves, the facts constituting, as it were, their own satire.

Little attention has been paid to Veblen as a satirist. Economists have been concerned chiefly with a factual appraisal of Veblen's ideas and have almost ignored the satiric animus glinting through them. Literary critics, misled by his purely technical reputation, have for the most part left his work unanalyzed; and when H. L. Mencken once attempted it, he came the ludicrous cropper of reading Veblen's stylistic ironies as mere professorial verbosity. Veblen's rhetoric, his mingling of anthropological, sociological and economic analysis, and the oblique insights of his thought were all so novel that criticism has been slow to deal with him, and slow to comprehend his remarkable exploitation of the devices of skepticism and irony.

Skepticism and irony were for Thorstein Veblen instruments of an elaborate strategy. They were both elephantine armorplate and tremendous tonnage of heavy guns combined. From behind the device of the Persian visitor and the Chinese sage, Montesquieu and Goldsmith had projected their satire on eighteenth-century Europe. Veblen magnified the trick to an unbelievable remoteness and abstraction. Not using any overt fiction, characterizing himself only by manner, he put on the insuperable detachment of a Martian observer: he was an inhabitant of another world curiously describing and analyzing the habits of an alien form of existence. Constantly he repeated disclaimers of any "intention to find fault," or to be speaking "by way of praise or blame," or to imply "anything discreditable or immoral." Almost as often he made ironical show of commendation, "these wise measures of restraint and incitement," "this straight and narrow path of business integrity." Both serve to maintain his complicated masquerade of scientific dissection.

But Veblen is more than an interplanetary traveler from Mars. He is a Martian professor, couching his comments in a grotesquely sesquipedalian vocabulary that is a parody of all the pedantic jargon that ever obscured meaning. This solemn and ludicrous style has a triple function. It underlines the grave and scholarly disinterestedness we are supposed to believe behind Veblen's statements; it helps protect the author from censorial indignation by obscuring for many people his subversive meaning; and it makes subtly absurd the very institutions it pretends to handle with such pompous reverence. Veblen's style, in fact, which has seemed to hasty critics a weakness, is one of his greatest claims to respect. It is idiosyncratic, deliberately. But it is no harder to grow accustomed to than the styles of Meredith or Henry James. And once assimilated, its seeming ponderousness turns out to be rich in delicate malice and destructive sarcasms.

Veblen's whole career is a perfect illustration of Kenneth Burke's suggestion that in satire "the artist is seeking simultaneously to take risks and escape punishment for his boldness." Veblen's work was a detailed and devastating criticism of finance-capitalism, a withering analysis of business civilization; and yet his livelihood lay in an academic career carried on in universities endowed and dominated by business men. Veblen said ten times over and ten times more damagingly the things that Sinclair Lewis sketched in the flaring caricature of "Babbitt" and "Arrowsmith." But Veblen was careful to say them in scholarly books on abstract topics written in a polysyllabic style both repellent and, often, incomprehensible to the bankers, business men and corporation counsel who made up the personnel of most boards of trustees. Even so, in the end his ambiguities caught up with him. He found it increasingly difficult to obtain scholarly posts to which his eminence entitled him, and was able to hold them only during steadily decreasing periods of time. At last nowhere but in the New School for Social Research was academic freedom broad enough to harbor him.

What were these subversive doctrines that made Veblen both satirist and suspect revolutionary? All their main tenets appear in his most brilliant work of satire, "The Theory of the Leisure Class"; although he examines in greater detail now one and now another facet of his general thesis in a cluster of further books including "The Instinct of Workmanship," "The Theory of Business Enterprise," "The Engineers and the Price System" and "The Higher Learning in America." All these purport to be, and are in fact, serious contributions to economics and sociology, but their force as satire lies in their deep undercurrent of sardonic implication.

Orthodox economists have usually held that "the end of acquisition and accumulation" is "the consumption of the goods accumulated." But this, Veblen says, very speedily ceases to be true except in the most primitive communities. The true motive "that lies at the root of ownership is emulation." "The possession of wealth confers honor; it is an invidious distinction." As ancient man moves from the primitive to the barbaric warlike stages of society, warriors seize the goods and enslave the women of a conquered foe. By a single act of violent aggression they acquire riches others toiled to produce. How much more glorious than the slow routine of agriculture or the monotonous application of basket-weaving and pottery-making! Warlike exploitation and similar predatory exercises of ferocity and cunning become "honorable" and "noble"; mere craftsmanship and production are relegated to women and weaklings as an irksome drudgery. In the later barbarian

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society of the Middle Ages, war and its attendant arts are still those panoplied in prestige, and the labor of field, household, shop or trade the province of inferiors. In our "quasi-peaceable" modern barbarism that calls itself civilization, direct aggression grows less obtrusive, giving way to ingenuity and overreaching. Property is now the symbol of reputable potency. Wealth has become "a meritorious act," and the true animus of gainful pursuit may be characterized as Keeping up with the Joneses.

But wealth cannot be a source of prestige, Veblen ironically continues, unless it visibly shines in men's eyes. The Joneses must know they are being kept up with, and even passed in the race. One's scale of living is invidiously impressive to the degree that it displays lavish waste, and the opulence of one's resources dazzling to the extent that one seems able to abstain from all useful labor. "Conspicuous consumption" carried to the point of "conspicuous waste" and an emancipation from productive activity manifested as "conspicuous leisure" are therefore impressive testimony to one's pecuniary merits. The invidious function of many cultural attainments is that they are evidence not merely of one's present comfortable status, but of "a past performance of leisure": for such economically useless refinements as the classical languages, art, music, the proprieties of dress and decorum, and the more expensive and complicated games and idle pastimes can be mastered only by prolonged application not easy for those gainfully employed.

A further refinement in conspicuous leisure is that others may be used to enhance one's prestige by a "performance of vicarious leisure." The business man does not pretend to a magnificent abstention from toil. (His activities have social prestige, however, to the degree that they are remote from crude productivity or handling of goods: the broker, selling the abstract symbols of property, is higher in the financial elite than the jobber who deals in actual consumable goods; and the financier, creating and manipulating those august symbols, crowns the hierarchy as a money king.) But the man of monetary might hires others to do for him the leisure activities he is too busy to enact himself. If he would evince his culture by authorship, ghosts will supply him with literacy and knowledge; would he be a connoisseur of art, taste and learning may be bought and paraded as his own. Wives and dependents will pass their time for him in an elaborate consumption of "dwellings, furniture, bric-à-brac, wardrobe and meals" and an expensively useless round of activities—calls, drives, clubs, bazaars, luxuriously garbed appearances at operas, concerts, flower-shows, duly prescribed pilgrimages to Europe, Palm Beach, Saratoga. All these activities loudly hint the financial prowess that supports them, and many of them are extremely fatiguing and tiresome to their practitioners. Large numbers of highly specialized servants afford evidence of their master's ability to support profusely wasteful duties. "Hence it comes about that in the economy of the leisure class the busy housewife of early patriarchal days, with her retinue of hard-working handmaidens, presently gives place to the lady and the lackey." Costly entertainments, finally, make the guests vicarious consumers for their own host while they witness "that excess of good things" that the host "is unable to dispose of single-handed."

There is no need to labor the sharpness of wit and the satiric insight of this intellectual structure. Limitations of space render it impossible to detail the solidity of demonstration with which Veblen buttresses his analysis by an examination of our entire economic system. He draws upon the evidence of anthropology to support that view of the origin of property that Anatole France displayed in the hilarious mythological chapters of "Penguin Island." He shows the consistent principle behind that chaos of chicane, mendacity and exploitation that Wells drew in "Tono-Bungay." Distinguishing between business and industry, he suggests cogent reasons for identifying business and the business temperament with the predatory and aggressive, using a "conscientious withdrawal of efficiency" to sabotage social welfare. In the very spirit of "Jonathan Wild" he writes that "the gifts of good-nature, equity and indiscriminate sympathy" impede, whereas "freedom from scruple, from sympathy, honesty and regard for life . . . further the success of the individual in the pecuniary culture."

Sinclair Lewis often seems to be nothing but dramatized Veblen. Pecuniary emulation is shown multiplying useless needs in the gadget-ridden world of "Babbitt"; and the domination of business men smothering and prostituting genuine science and scholarship, which Veblen analyzed in "The Higher Learning in America," Lewis narrowed down to the realm of medicine alone and mirrored in "Arrowsmith." The acrimonious tirades of Tolstoy's "What Is Art?" Veblen subjects to measured insight in his elucidation of how pecuniary snobbery imposes itself imperceptibly but pervasively even within the realm of esthetic judgment. This whole range of observation and judgment —both in those who wrote before him and in later writers, some of whom indubitably lean on him—Veblen integrates into a penetrating intellectual system.

Veblen's sardonic paradoxes are almost unexampled in their power to startle. The involved and painstakingly equivocal sentences uncoil their tortuous syllables interminably in a parody of academic stodginess, and then the legerdemain that was preparing is accomplished, the heavy abstractions concentrate themselves into a weighty epigram as incisive as an axe, and the slaughter is done. The annihilating force of Veblen's blows is derived, of course, from their intellectual unity and strength; there are no scattered strokes; every one is in the same direction, and every one strikes home. But it would be an error to overlook Veblen's ability to sharpen their cutting edge by devices of style.

The device he chiefly uses is a deliberately planned incongruity. We have already seen it in some of his epithets, "conspicuous consumption," "conspicuous waste," "vicarious leisure," "*the performance* of leisure," "conscientious withdrawal of efficiency," where the mere crackle of the syllables implies an ironic derision sometimes reinforced by the unexpectedness of the thought relationships. The same qualities can be seen in such combinations as "reputable notoriety," "genteel solemnities" (academic ceremonies), "captains of erudition" (university presidents), "reputable waste of time and means," "politely blameless dissipation." They appear in his description of the erection of churches as a "devout consumption of sacred edifices," and of their characteristic architecture as an "austerely wasteful discomfort." Sometimes they concentrate themselves into phrases discreetly mordant, as when he outlines the qualifications in those who would find favor with university presidents as a "ready versatility of convictions, and a staunch loyalty to their bread," or remarks that the endowment of cultural institutions has "the character of an investment in good

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fame." Not infrequently he coins an epigram: "Conservatism, being an upper-class characteristic, is decorous; . . . innovation, being a lower-class phenomenon, is vulgar." "Gentle blood is blood which has been ennobled by protracted contact with accumulated wealth or unbroken prerogative."

Two things are noteworthy about this technique. One is its elaborately innocent use of planned incongruity, expressions whose sober dignity is jarred by a qualification that seems out of tone or contradictory, but that turns out to have an esoteric and wounding appropriateness. The other is that the wounds so inflicted are almost invariably mortal, so that his epithet remains in memory as a derogatory monument to the concept it has slain. First he twists his description into a distortion of the conventional that is discovered to have a lethal truth; with it he crushes the life from a deluded idea, and leaves it beneath his own ponderous phrase transformed now into the headstone on a malefactor's grave. This is indeed, not only in the sense originally intended by Mrs. Malaprop, but in the literal application of that lady's words, "a nice derangement of epitaphs."

That his epithets were epitaphs, however, is not at all a product of the manner. Veblen carried irony to the point where it became a burlesque of itself, but he did so to conceal a genuine anger and to protect himself in a dangerously radical undertaking. When his irony seems on occasion the most ludicrous farce, the farce is really more often in the facts from which his probing sentences have stripped their masks. His pretense of a positively inhuman detachment enables him to engage in his suspect enterprise of eliciting the satire intrinsic in our pecuniary standards. A trace of indignation and Veblen would have been labeled a fanatic; but that lunar irony of his ranges over delusions and leaves devastation behind. EDGAR JOHNSON

Books in Review

Air-Raid Warden

ONE OF THE LESSER PROBLEMS of giving military aid to a nation while remaining officially out of the war is surely the assumption of a constructive critical attitude. The American liberal can say easily where his sympathies lie in the present war and he can urge that his feelings be shared by others and translated into practical action. But in the matter of criticism, where Britain is involved, the thousands of miles that separate him from the scene of the fighting must serve as a muzzle on frank expression. He may complain about British muddling, about opportunities lost once and likely to be lost again; he can urge stronger efforts in the field of propaganda and peace aims and kick against irritants of British officialdom. But on the more delicate issues of British government policy, such as the treatment of aliens or reactionary politics in domestic affairs, he is inclined to fall silent, shy of attacking the men who represent a country that is fighting for its life, nursing his disapproval and envying his fellow liberals in England itself, who have steadily combined patriotism with aggressive criticism.

It is in this respect that the British liberal in the blitz has a privileged position. He can demand that a war for democracy be fought democratically without a feeling of uneasiness because of his own non-participation. And his privilege extends even further, to such matters as courage, heroism and what it takes to stand up under fire. No American can suggest that air raids are not so bad as they appear to be, or that humorous aspects of living persist under the fiercest bombing. Because he is sitting safe in a city with no blackout, the American must see English life as unmitigated horror and the men and women who undergo it as natural heroes: his safety permits no critical breakdown of a bombed population.

This is the chief reason why certain writings from England are so fascinating to us. The more we insist that life in England is hell and all her people heroes, the more negative is the response from our fellows on the other side. There is no way of changing this; so long as we hold front seats and do not step onto the stage itself we shall continue to see the players as tragedians, regardless of what they say and do, and they will continue to insist that between the lines they forget their parts, joke—often callously—and play down as mere common sense what we must elevate to glory.

John Strachey's new book,[1] based on his experiences as an air-raid warden, is unquestionably the best presentation we have had of the thinking Englishman's attitude toward the air raids of last September. The American who used it as a guide for his own writings on London life would be written off by his friends as callous and shortsighted. Mr. Strachey, on the other hand, will command supreme admiration from his readers here, for the very reason that from first to last he dismisses the heroics of battle—and so appears, willy-nilly, as the greatest hero of them all. His approach is deliberately simple, so staid and unemotional that we see very quickly he has vowed to report only his exact experiences and to admit pain and grief only when they have hit home and left no doubt of their genuineness. "It is true and comforting," he says, "that the reality is never as bad as the fantasy: never as terrifying, never as shattering. That is why the raids, when they came, were such a genuine relief to so many people. But there is another side to that. The reality is seldom as interesting, as rich, as exciting, as satisfying, as the fantasy, either. So much so that we do not recognize 'things' when they do 'happen' to us."

Throughout, Mr. Strachey works with a monosyllabic prose that should not for a moment be thought artless; clearly it has been chosen as the soberest way of saying that if life goes on under the blitz, so do the everyday responses of men and women. Mr. Strachey tells us, for instance, that the people in a rescue party who dig a tunnel through a mound of debris take enormous satisfaction in the craftsmanship involved; that to ask them to stop digging when they are on the point of exhaustion is cruel. "Every such

[1] Digging for Mrs. Miller: Some Experiences of an Air-Raid Warden, by John Strachey. New York: Random House. 150 pages. $1.25.

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attempted rescue involves a scheme or plan, based upon a guess of the buried person's position, the lie of the debris—and many other factors. It is intolerable to leave before you come to the solution of the riddle." The same situation, in reverse, is that of the suicide squad reluctantly digging for a delayed-action bomb that none of them believes to be there. "It's like this," he said. "We don't mind digging for a *real* bomb. But we hate digging for nothing: moving all this stuff; it's not worth it." And sometimes the normal pattern of response repeats itself objectionably, as when the wardens of Mr. Strachey's post asked the town council for timber struts to support the ceiling of their station. The council replied that steel struts were essential for safety and impossible to obtain. "On the other hand, if the basement were propped with wooden supports and the house collapsed, burying the wardens, the borough might be held responsible for their deaths."

And so it goes on, the normal response not changed, only emphasized: the need to be the one who has guessed right; the dislike of empty labor; the extension of bureaucracy; the girl who puts on more make-up than usual after an "incident"; the rabbit breeder wandering through the blitz saying, Has anyone seen my rabbits?; the old host, a victim of incendiaries, apologetically remarking, "Not much to see now, but a splendid blaze before you came"; the woman reached after twenty-six hours of digging, who "sat there contentedly and innocently, like a disheveled child sitting up in bed . . ."; and Miss Sterling—an all-too-brief portrait of the author's superior—looking for a bomb in a garden:

> Miss Sterling certainly presented a singular appearance. She was in her uniform, with an old and curiously crumpled brown leather coat on top of it, her tin hat pushed somewhat forward on her head. She had a walking-stick in her hand, and was prodding and poking about in the recesses of the backyard. She looked a little like a particularly earnest member of the Anti-Litter League, determined that no scrap of paper, cigarette carton, or piece of orange peel, should escape her pointed collecting stick.

But to us she is, under stranger circumstances, the middle-aged country lady of a hundred English novels.

I would not suggest that in this unruffled narrative of the Battle of Britain we find only normality stretched easily and humorously to a point of adaptation. The horror of a bombed city is there, but for the warden it seems to strike home after the all-clear has sounded. It is in the hours off-duty that he "saw again the dead girl and the smashed young man upstairs at No. 50; heard Mrs. Wells cry out for release; saw the twitching leg; felt the hidden body give from his boot. . . ." But because calm preoccupation with the work in hand overrules the moments of tragedy, we must recognize it as the chief lesson of this book, even though, as neutrals, we cannot teach it ourselves. Throughout, the insistence is on values that function invisibly:

> They agreed that ninety-nine people out of a hundred were neither timid nor brave, but just ordinary: and that that was what was wanted. Outstanding physical courage must be, they supposed, a delightful grace in a man or a woman—like an infectious laugh, or beautiful hands, or a lovely speaking voice. But of that they had no experience; there had never been an occasion for any such thing.

NIGEL DENNIS

Far Eastern Omens

Japan Unmasked, by Hallett Abend. New York: Ives Washburn, Inc. 322 pages. $3.
The Fight for the Pacific, by Mark J. Gayn. New York: William Morrow and Company. 390 pages. $3.

TWO AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS of long tenure in the Far East here sum up their experiences. Though differing in temperament, method and approach, they come out at the same point—a kind of cool fatalism. There will be a war in the Pacific, and America will be in it. And it will come rather sooner than later. Both writers reach this conclusion with nothing of old-fashioned "journalistic alarmism" and both marshal facts and evidence of tendencies to support their positions.

Mr. Abend's book is somewhat discontinuous. There are twenty chapters in some three hundred pages, and they are successive rather than connected, moving without any logical thread from one country to another and one subject to another. But in the totality they achieve unity. They give a vivid impression of the cruel chaos, the waste and suffering of what he calls "The New Disorder in Eastern Asia." A malicious anarchy has been let loose on half a continent, not so consciously willed or premeditated as in Europe but carrying with it no less of destruction and human tragedy.

Mr. Abend is primarily a reporter, and a good one. He makes his points with facts and episodes found at first hand. His own experiences were dramatic and are vividly told. He left China rather precipitately after fourteen years because his life was in danger. He had been attacked, robbed, looted and threatened with assassination. He was compelled to go around with a bodyguard, and even so his life had become a poor insurance risk. He decided to leave. In this as in other episodes there is revealed the anarchy that prevails within the Japanese themselves and that is reflected in larger projection throughout China. There is no single "Japan" in China now. There is a conflict of internal lawlessness, without organized discipline or control. There are the official Japanese organs of occupation and there are quasi-official or officially supported hoodlums. Japan in China is further from law and order than ever China was in the days when indignant foreign business men and correspondents used to write of Chinese chaos. There was never anything so unmoral, so needlessly vicious and cruel as the blight that has settled on China. Mr. Abend writes with bitterness and sometimes with a touch of malice, as one paying off old scores; but he generally cites facts to bear him out.

Mr. Gayn has more of historical perspective and tries to set things in their background of time and causes. His book is therefore more systematic than Mr. Abend's, though there is perhaps too much repetition. He has a brisk, galloping style which is effective for quick reading but sometimes manages to gallop over points of questionable fact. He wants to generalize in order to get on with his argument and sometimes the generalizations are too pat.

Mr. Gayn was born in the Far East and knows it intimately. He, too, is writing from first-hand knowledge, though he deals with events rather than with personal experiences. Here, then, are the main contenders in the struggle in the Pacific, and the events in which for these

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last ten or more years they have been taking their positions.

"Japan knows her hour has arrived," he says, "and she will strike tomorrow, next week, perhaps next month. And when she strikes, her foe will be the United States." This may be a bit melodramatic in expression, but the soberest student of the Far East will hesitate to dispute the analysis. The time element may be forced, but not the direction.

It is interesting that neither author troubles to tell, except casually and in parentheses, what the American stake is that requires it to dispute mastery of the Pacific. Neither argues the question whether America should or should not take up the Japanese challenge. Both assume that America will. From the point of view of readers not familiar with the Far Eastern background it may be unfortunate that they make assumptions, but as a diagnosis of world politics it is probably sound.

Whether or not it is true, as both Abend and Gayn hold, that America cannot live with a Japan rampant in the Pacific, it is probably true that America will not think it can, which for practical political purposes comes to the same thing. These are both, therefore, timely books.

NATHANIEL PEFFER

Midsummer Madhouse

Sodom by the Sea, by Oliver Pilat and Jo Ranson. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 343 pages, illustrated. $3.

THIS IS a fine book for any library of show business in America, or of American life itself for that matter. Coney Island has stood as the capital city of the carnival time as long as any of us can remember, and there isn't a city remote enough not to have been reached by its influence. The rides, dips, chutes, barrel-rolls, blowhole theatres, wheels and whips were brought to their various states of insane perfection, if not actually developed, there. The hot-dog got its first national prominence there, and the lord knows how many sideshow quirks and weird eating customs. In some manner never accounted for, people both get bored with the latest thing very rapidly and never seem to tire of the same old things. So whenever some shrewd bouncing fellow found some new combination of the staples—exhibitionism, thrill, sex, curiosity, hunger and holiday—and got Coney's millions to shuck out their nickels and dimes, he started something in the world.

Coney Island is a gay and a pathetic place, and since there is nothing in its midway, its parks and freak-shows so fantastic as the mass of those who come to look, I suppose everyone should see it once as it is today. (The present aspect of the place dates from the extension of the nickel subway in 1920.) The authors of this book seem to know it inside out and they have done a bewildering amount of research into a past which has practically no bibliography. They start with the Indians, the pirates, the Dutch and Lady Moody's colony. They have a lot of stuff on the later years when Coney was a class resort—for the racing, gambling and fight crowd. They have brief sketches of the men who started the modern amusement-park idea, not only names like Tilyou and Feltman, but those known only to professionals in merry-go-rounds, roller coasters, arcades, etc. They have the grim story of Frankie Yale and his brief empire. They tell about the time Jimmie Durante worked there among the thunderous singing waiters; about the pathetic and necessary gregariousness of the sideshow freaks; about an officer baffled by Siamese twins: if he pulled in the one for speeding, he was open to a charge of false arrest by the other.

Best of all, the authors keep an eye on the fundamental urge and meaning of the whole thing, without losing their taste for the fairly racy anecdote or their appreciation of show people. It is called an affectionate history, and it had to be: you get no such dossier of low and brawling genius by fussing around at a distance with notebook and reading glasses.

OTIS FERGUSON

Good Reading

The Keys of the Kingdom, by A. J. Cronin. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 344 pages. $2.50.

PAINSTAKINGLY DOCUMENTED, and written with narrative frenzy and craftsmanship, "The Keys of the Kingdom" makes good reading as an adventure novel. Like "The Citadel" it tells the story of a man who refuses to be hidebound by the petty restraints of his profession. Father Francis Chisholm is a gentle, dreamy, idealistic man whose simple faith in God, together with his love for mankind, led him into taking holy orders—mistakenly, as is apparent to the reader; for Father Chisholm is a social worker first of all, a priest only as an afterthought, his vows having been taken out of personal loneliness and despair. The story is built out of his bouts with the Church, which begin early in his seminary days in Spain, increase through his first curateship in a little Scottish town, and swell to melodramatic proportions during his thirty-five years at his mission in China, where they are further complicated by bandits, destructive wind storms, famine, pneumonic plague and native hostility.

The narrative is episodic throughout, almost amounting to a series of vignettes and short stories. Some of these, notably the one about the false miracle, the description of an ancient Portuguese-Christian village in China and Father Francis' healing of the Chinese merchant's son, are unusual and memorable. But the book lacks emotional unity, for the reason that it is presented through the eyes of a single character, and Father Francis' vision is not much deeper than, say, Robinson Crusoe's. Whether he's praying, or eating, or plotting the destruction of enemy bandits, he goes about it with a detached, casual matter-of-factness which makes us feel that we are watching him out of the wrong end of the opera glasses, and we withhold our sympathy accordingly. Possibly it is the priest's very goodness which kept Dr. Cronin himself standing in awe at a little distance from him; for he does wonders with the other priest, Father Anselm Mealey, who blends fawning conformity with his piety and thereby rises steadily to a bishopric. Father Mealey will stay in the memory long after good Father Chisholm has flitted away.

For a book based specifically on a spiritual theme, "The Keys of the Kingdom" is oddly superficial. But as an adventure and travel story, packed with melodramatic action, it is, as Father Francis says of something else, "as clean and sound as a good apple"—that, and nothing more.

DOROTHY MCCLEARY

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Inside Russia

Russia, by Sir Bernard Pares. New York: Penguin Books, Inc. 256 pages. 25 cents.

THIS COMPACT, inexpensive little book by Sir Bernard Pares probably approaches as closely as possible the unattainable ideal of complete objectivity about the Soviet Union. The ideal is unattainable, because no one can abstract himself entirely from his past, from his personal moral and intellectual and economic preferences and prejudices in discussing such a controversial subject as modern Russia. Russia has a heavier score of extremely "pro" and extremely "anti" books than almost any other subject.

The relatively high standard of objectivity which is characteristic of Sir Bernard's work cannot be attributed solely to his very long and intimate knowledge of pre-war Russia (supplemented by several visits to the Soviet Union in recent years), although this acquaintance with Russian culture and with the Russian people lends to his writing an authority which is too often lacking in the efforts of amateur short-time visitors to Moscow. His feelings about the Soviet Union rather neatly cancel out, with the result that he writes with a minimum of bias.

Sir Bernard is one of the few students of Russia who became perceptibly more favorable toward the Soviet regime during the years which immediately preceded the outbreak of the Second World War. A lifelong student of Russia, with many personal friends among the pre-war Russian liberals and radicals who were decimated by the Bolshevik Revolution, Sir Bernard's first reaction to the Soviet regime was definitely negative. For many years he was not allowed to enter the Soviet Union.

But after the extreme rigors of the first Five Year Plan (of which the author is a severe and faithful critic in the present book), Sir Bernard was allowed to visit the Soviet Union and set down by no means unfavorable impressions in his book, "Moscow Admits a Critic." What alienated some foreign doctrinaire Soviet sympathizers—the encouragement of old-fashioned Russian nationalism, the return to discipline in the schools—rather appealed to Sir Bernard.

And his own relative moral reactions were the reverse of those of the foreign sympathizer who justified or denied against overwhelming evidence the occurrence of a famine costing millions of lives in 1932-33 and then became "disillusioned" because Stalin killed off so many old Communists. But after having more or less reconciled himself to the Russia of 1935-36 and found a good deal to praise in its provision for social security, public health and recreation, he sustained the blow of the Stalin-Hitler pact.

It is in this mood of varied and balanced reactions that the present book is written; and the result is a refreshing absence of any desire to score points for or against the Soviet regime. On the other hand there is no pretense of any very profound analysis of the modern Soviet Union. What Sir Bernard gives is a series of brief essays and sketches, many of which deal with Tsarist Russia and with conditions during the Revolution and early years of the Soviet regime.

The author discusses at some length the Anglo-Soviet relations in the pre-war period and is inclined to censure the British government for refusing the Soviet proposal of a tripartite alliance in April, 1939. He is more optimistic about the results of the Stalin-Hitler pact than Stalin probably is himself at the present time, observing: "After all, what had we to offer as compared with Ribbentrop? We asked alliance and championship of Poland. Ribbentrop only asked for non-aggression: but once war was the order of the day, the door was open for easy gains, and not only at the expense of Poland."

Sir Bernard was in Russia at the time of the conclusion of this pact and reports that anti-Nazi propaganda was in full swing up to the moment of the signature. This, of course, does not prove that the pact was a sudden improvisation; it was rather a reflection of Stalin's policy of utilizing a threatened understanding with Great Britain and France as a means of bringing pressure on Hitler for better terms.

Revisiting a land which he had known and loved, Sir Bernard is perhaps a little inclined to underestimate the scars which the Revolution and the OGPU had inflicted on the body of Russian culture—one of the finest, although one of the most limited, as to the number of people who shared it, in Europe. One of the few inaccuracies in the book is the statement that "all education and all medical attendance are free to the individual at the expense of the state." Payment for secondary and higher education was introduced last year. As for medical attention, while it is legally free to all, those who can engage a physician privately usually prefer to do so, unless conditions in clinics and hospitals have changed since the reviewer was in Russia.

Sir Bernard is at his best in his studies of pre-war Russian history, thought and political and social institutions and contrives to impart a good deal of valuable information in brief compass. He has little to say, because neither he nor anyone else has much factual basis to form a sure judgment, on two points which are of world importance today: the efficiency of the Red Army and the disposition of the peasants to carry on guerrilla warfare on behalf of the Soviets in occupied regions.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

Contributors

GEROID TANQUARY ROBINSON, formerly an editor of The Freeman, is professor of History at Columbia University. He lived for some years in Russia and is the author of "Rural Russia Under the Old Regime."

MAX WERNER's latest book is "Battle for the World: The Strategy and Diplomacy of the Second World War," recently published by Modern Age Books.

A. WYN WILLIAMS was the American correspondent of The Manchester Guardian Commercial from its inception in 1920 until its temporary suspension due to the war in September, 1939. He has frequently contributed anonymously to various national American publications, chiefly on trade matters.

EDGAR JOHNSON's essay in this issue is part of a book on satire which will be published next spring.

NATHANIEL PEFFER is professor of International Relations at Columbia University. His most recent book is "Prerequisites to Peace in the Far East."

DOROTHY MCCLEARY is the author of three novels, "Not for Heaven," "Naked to Laughter" and "Paved with Good Intentions," and has contributed short stories to Story, The New Yorker, Harper's Bazaar and other magazines.

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

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